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ABSTRACT 
The core insight of this Article is that patent rights are not 
static and fixed, as they are commonly portrayed, but malleable. 
Commentators typically treat patent rights as if they are unchanging, 
frozen forever at the moment the patent issues. But patent law isn’t 
so limited. Patent rights are surprisingly malleable: The scope and 
strength of the right can be changed even after the patent is issued 
through a surprisingly large array of mechanisms, allowing actors 
operating within the patent system the ability to change the very 
contours of individual patents. Malleability thus adds an important 
layer onto previous work recognizing that patent rights are 
uncertain: It is not merely that patent rights can involve something 
akin to a roll of the dice or an inability to definitively pin down their 
scope, but that the outcome of that roll or the contours of the 
uncertainty can be changed by the actions of the parties involved.  
This Article develops the concept of malleable rights, a new 
lens through which to view patents, and distinguishes the idea of 
malleable rights from that of probabilistic rights. Using this concept, 
the Article explores the ways in which patent rights are malleable 
and examines possible theoretical justifications for the malleability 
of patent rights, concluding that regardless of whether one accepts 
such justifications, recognizing the malleability of patent rights has 
profound consequences for discussions about emerging patent 
monetization strategies, for the patent system as a whole, and 
perhaps for views about rights over intangibles generally.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Some persons seem to suppose that a claim in a patent is like a nose of 
wax, which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely 
referring to the specification, so as to make it include something more 
than, or something different from, what its words express. . . . The claim is 
a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the 
patentee define precisely what his invention is; and it is unjust to the 
public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner 
different from the plain import of its terms. This has been so often 
expressed in the opinions of this court that it is unnecessary to pursue the 
subject further. 
Justice Bradley, White v. Dunbar (1886)1 
Every patent lawyer knows at least the first few lines of this 
sacred mantra from White v. Dunbar. The case involved a patented 
process for canning shrimp. Conventional canning methods had 
typically involved placing food in a can, sealing the can, then boiling 
or steaming it all.2 When shellfish contact a metal can, however, they 
                                                     
 1. White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1886). 
 2. For a history of the technological developments surrounding canning 
and its importance in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see SUE SHEPHARD, 
PICKLED, POTTED, AND CANNED: HOW THE ART AND SCIENCE OF FOOD PRESERVING 
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produce a “profus[ion] . . . of a black substance, generally believed 
to be sulphur.”3 Since diners generally prefer not to consume smelly 
black shrimp, the Dunbars4 developed a solution: place the shrimp in 
a fabric bag to prevent direct contact with the metal can. They 
patented this process, claiming a canning process in which a “textile 
fabric” was interposed between the walls of the can and the shrimp.5 
Apparently unsatisfied with the original scope of the claim, the 
Dunbars later sought and obtained a reissuance6 that simply required 
“an enveloping material for the shrimps.”7 Perhaps this was because 
a competitor had begun using sheets of wax-coated paper in its cans 
of shrimp.8 
But in the 1880s, as now, new claims resulting from a 
reissuance were not permitted to exceed the scope of the patent’s 
original claims.9 And the Supreme Court concluded the “textile 
fabric” claims did exactly that.10 In this context, Justice Bradley 
uttered those famous words, the premise being that patent rights are 
not malleable “like a nose of wax.”11 
                                                                                                                
CHANGED THE WORLD 226-256 (2000). The United States was at the forefront of this 
movement: “By the 1870s America was packing more different kinds of food in far 
larger quantities than any other country.” Id. at 247. 
 3. White, 119 U.S. at 51. 
 4. The inventors listed on the patent are George W. Dunbar, George H. 
Dunbar, and Francis B. Dunbar. See U.S. Patent No. 178,916 (filed Feb. 1, 1876). 
According to one account, however, it was George W.’s wife who actually 
suggested the use of a muslin bag in the cans. See 65 Years of Mississippi Seafood 
History, DAILY HERALD, July 3, 1933, at 16. For a short history of the G.W. Dunbar 
Sons Canning Factory, see EDMOND BOUDREAUX, THE SEAFOOD CAPITAL OF THE 
WORLD: BILOXI’S MARITIME HISTORY 48-49 (2011). 
 5. ތ916 Patent. 
 6. A reissuance is a process whereby a patent is surrendered to the patent 
office and new claims requested. 35 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2012). 
 7. White, 119 U.S. at 48-49; U.S. Patent No. 9,957 (filed Apr. 9, 1881) 
(reissued Dec. 6, 1881). 
 8. White, 119 U.S. at 49. 
 9. There are exceptions; for example, under current law a broadening 
claim may be sought within two years of issuance of the surrendered patent. 
35 U.S.C. § 251(d). 
 10. White, 119 U.S. at 49-50 (“The claim in the original patent was for 
placing textile fabric between the can and its contents; whilst in the reissue it is for 
interposing between the metal can and the shrimps an enveloping material for the 
shrimps. This is certainly, on its face, a very important enlargement of the claim; 
and we see nothing in the context of the specification in the original patent which 
could possibly give the claim so broad a construction.”). 
 11. Id. at 51. I use the term “patent rights” to refer to the fundamental idea 
that patents imbue their owners with certain exclusive rights such as the exclusive 
right to make, use, offer for sale, and sell the invention, wherein “the invention” is 
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Yet, Justice Bradley was wrong, at least as a descriptive matter. 
Patent rights are malleable. Fixation—a nose of stone rather than a 
nose of wax—may be a normative goal, but it is not reality. And, as 
the very concept of the reissued claim at issue in White v. Dunbar 
indicates, patent rights are malleable at least in part by deliberate 
design. This is not to say that patent rights are just unformed clay, 
waiting to be manipulated into a shape pleasing to the crafter: The 
constraints imposed in White illustrate that there are limits. But 
within those limits, which can sometimes be quite broad and 
themselves flexible, patent rights are imbued with substantially more 
malleability than conventional views assume.  
This Article develops the concept of malleability in the context 
of patent law. In defining malleability, I distinguish it from the idea 
that patent boundaries are merely probabilistic, a characteristic 
already recognized by the literature.12 “Probabilistic” refers to the 
idea that patent rights are not certain as long as they are alive.13 There 
is nearly always some degree of uncertainty over the scope of a 
                                                                                                                
understood to mean the invention as claimed in the patent. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(a) (2015). As I discuss in Section III.C, patents are really made up of a set of 
claims, each which makes use of different language to claim the same invention. At 
least that’s the idea in theory. In practice, patent claims function in a much more 
complex way. However, for purposes of laying out the basic concept here, referring 
to the knot of rights over an invention granted by a patent as “patent rights” should 
be sufficient.  
 12. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 75, 75 (2005) (observing that “[f]or many years, economists typically 
conceptualized patents as well-defined property rights” but noting that this belief has 
changed more recently). Lemley and Shapiro identify two types of uncertainty in 
patents: “1) uncertainty about the commercial significance of the invention being 
patented, and 2) uncertainty about the validity and scope of the legal right being 
granted.” Id. at 76. It is the second type of uncertainty that I refer to here. There is 
another type of uncertainty frequently ascribed to patents, that of indeterminacy. 
See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 
1687, 1689–92 (2013) (describing the indeterminacy critique in patent law). While a 
thin line could be drawn that parses probability from indeterminacy (the former is 
one of chance while the latter relates more to the ability of words to describe things), 
the underlying point is that the results are uncertain. Both probability and 
indeterminacy involve the same basic concept: that we do not know exactly what the 
outcome will be. For this reason, I don’t dig deeply into the difference here. That 
said, to the extent one characterizes claims as primarily involving an indeterminacy 
problem, it inevitably manifests as the probabilistic nature of patent litigation.  
 13. Of course, once a patent claim has been adjudicated to be invalid, and 
all avenues of appeal exhausted, then the validity and scope of that patent right is no 
longer uncertain: The patent right is dead as a doorknob. But at that point the right 
has ceased to be a right; it is now nothing.  
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given patent and its validity.14 A person who studies a patent can 
certainly make probabilistic determinations about issues of validity 
and scope, just as a casino patron can conclude that a roulette ball is 
more likely to land on red than “zero.” But even the best, most 
careful, most sophisticated patent attorney is unlikely to offer a 
conclusion about a patent’s validity and scope with absolute 
confidence. Recognizing patent rights as probabilistic has had 
important implications for our collective understanding of patents. 
Equally important, however, is the idea that patent rights are 
malleable: that the very rights themselves can be altered by the 
actors who interact with the issued patent. In other words, the 
answers to questions about patent validity and scope can be changed 
by the actions of the patent’s owners and potential infringers. Patent 
rights can be pushed and pulled. Their very existence and shape can 
be changed through an array of legal mechanisms. Of course, 
because patent rights are both probabilistic and malleable, actors 
interacting with patents are rarely able to influence those rights with 
absolute certainty. At best, they can affect the probabilities involved, 
much like a skilled poker player. Yet despite a patent’s uncertainties, 
the point remains that those probabilities can be affected by the 
actors who interact with the patent. This concept—that patent rights 
are malleable—has never before been developed in the literature 
outside of a few articles discussing a specific, narrow form of 
malleability.15  
                                                     
 14. While patents are imbued with a presumption of validity upon issuance, 
that presumption is merely that: a presumption. 
 15. The closest work to the concept of malleability that I advance here is in 
two strands: claim interpretation and post-issuance amendment at the patent office. 
The claim interpretation literature seeks to grapple with the uncertainties that are 
inherent in interpreting patent language, either because of linguistic ambiguity, see 
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent 
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1752-53 (2009), or because of policy 
conflicts, see, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L. J. 530, 533-34 (2013). It tends 
to focus on whether or not claim boundaries are uncertain, why that might be so, and 
what the consequences of that uncertainty might be, and thus is really about 
probabilistic rights rather than malleability. A second, arguably closer, strand of 
scholarship is that dealing with the ability of parties to amend the formal shape of 
their claims after issuance through post-issuance proceedings at the patent office. 
Tun-Jen Chiang’s work, in particular, points out that these mechanisms allow claims 
to “be explicitly changed throughout the patent’s lifetime, thereby moving the patent 
boundary” and he argues that “issued patents should not be amended.” Tun-Jen 
Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 525 & 526 (2010). The 
ability to formally change patent claims through patent office proceedings is an 
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The concept of malleable rights could arguably apply to other 
rights beyond patent law. Indeed, taken to its extreme, fundamental 
rights such as the right of possession over a lawfully purchased 
chattel could be argued to be malleable. However, I do not make 
such a broad claim here. My point is not that all legal rights are just a 
lump of clay that skilled hands can form into any shape ex post. 
Rather, I define and describe the concept of malleability and 
demonstrate that patent rights are surprisingly malleable. To be clear: 
my account is largely descriptive, although I do consider some 
possible normative justifications for and concerns about malleability 
towards the end.  
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I 
provides an introduction to the way that patent rights are typically 
conceptualized as fixed rights. Part II describes the view that patent 
rights are probabilistic, which is a necessary precursor to the concept 
of malleability. Part III sets out the concept of malleability and 
explains how patent rights are malleable. Finally, Part IV explores 
possible theoretical justifications for malleability in patent rights.  
I. CONVENTIONAL VIEWS OF THE NATURE OF THE PATENT RIGHT 
Implicit—and sometimes explicit—in discussions about patent 
rights is an assumption that those rights are fixed at the moment the 
patent issues. Below, I offer a few examples to illustrate how the law 
and literature assume the fixed nature of patent rights.  
An obvious starting point is the granting statute, which has 
remained largely unchanged since 1952.16 In reading the language of 
                                                                                                                
important part of what makes patent rights malleable, but it is only one piece of what 
makes patent rights malleable. 
 16. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593 ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952), 
provides the core statutory elements governing patent law today. See JANICE M. 
MUELLER, PATENT LAW 33 (3d ed. 2009). While earlier incarnations of the patent 
law contain similar concepts and wording, virtually all post-1952 commentary 
focuses on the 1952 Act and any relevant subsequent amendments. To be sure, 
Article I, § 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes Congress “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries” is technically the starting point. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This 
provision, however, simply establishes the outer boundaries of what Congress can 
do and perhaps what the scope of the exclusive right might be. See Graham v. John 
Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) (“The Congress in the exercise of the 
patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional 
purpose.”). It is the implementing statute that actually provides virtually all of the 
meaningful contours of that right. 
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the current text in § 154, note how it describes those rights, 
particularly with its use of the term “the invention”:  
35 U.S.C. § 154 – Contents and term of patent; provisional rights 
(a) In General.— 
(1) Contents.— Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention 
and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention 
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United 
States . . . referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.17 
With this passage, the patent law offers the prospect of 
exclusive rights over “the invention.” And of course we all know 
what “the invention” is: If it were an unclear concept, certainly the 
statute would define it!18 Nowhere does the statute suggest that those 
rights can change; to the contrary, the reference to “the invention” 
implies that there is a thing—the invention—to which rights are 
being granted.19 Language elsewhere in the patent statute is similar: 
Section 112, for example, requires “a written description of the 
invention.”20 The statute thus ties the patent rights to the invention, as 
if it were a concept that everyone understood as plain as day.21  
                                                     
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
 18. And it does. But not really. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (“The term 
‘invention’ means invention or discovery.”). 
 19. For purposes of describing the core concept of malleability, I don’t see 
it mattering a great deal whether one takes a view of the invention-as-specification 
or invention-as-claim view; both are malleable. See infra note 93.  
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (emphasis added); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) 
(2012) (referencing “any patented invention” in stating the action for patent 
infringement). 
 21. Although it is not directly relevant to the main point of this Article, “the 
invention” is hardly such an easy concept. As Oskar Liivak has demonstrated, the 
conventional assertion that “the claim” is synonymous with “the invention” is 
inherently faulty. See Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the 
Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3-6 (2012). Nor has the literature assembled a 
coherent understanding of the statutory meaning of “the invention.” See id. at 4 
(“[A] substantive discussion of the invention as a statutory concept is nowhere to be 
found in modern patent doctrine or scholarship.”). Liivak himself offers such a 
meaning from a disclosure-centric perspective, but that meaning is not one that all 
agree on. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Forcing Patent Claims, 113 MICH. L. REV. 513, 525-
26 (referring to Liivak’s approach as a hollow standard). More importantly, Liivak’s 
proposed meaning draws implicitly on a fixed conception of the patent rights: The 
invention as disclosed serves as an anchor for the claims. See Liivak, supra, at 6 
(“The claims are not abstract legal boundaries, but rather, they ‘particularly point[] 
out and distinctly claim[]’ the actual substantive invention described by the 
specification.”). 
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This makes sense, particularly when one recognizes that 
modern U.S. patent law is deeply rooted in a nineteenth century 
manufacturing and agrarian world. In such a world, where inventions 
take the form of plows, cotton bale ties, and rubber vulcanization 
methods, ³the invention´ can assume a relatively clear form.22
Indeed, between 1836 and 1870, inventors were required to submit 
models of their inventions to the patent office.23 The invention as a 
thing, a rem, was a perfectly logical assumption in such a world.24
While modern views of ³the invention´ have moved away from 
seeing an invention as a ³thing´ and towards viewing it as a more 
abstract bundle of rights,25 they nevertheless retain the conception of 
those rights as fixed and unchanging. Consider Rebecca Eisenberg¶s
work on the experimental use exception (with emphases added):  
A United States patent confers the exclusive right to make, use, and sell 
the invention set forth in the patent claims in the United States for 
seventeen years. During the term of the patent the patent holder has the 
right to stop anyone from using the invention²even an innocent infringer 
who develops the same invention independently.26
22. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 574
n.152 (2009) (³[I]nventions early in the history of the American patent system
tended to be available commercially and also to be simple and mechanical in
nature . . . .´).
23. See Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 621, 642 n.103 (2010) (describing the model requirement). 
24. Cf. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,
20 J. L. & ECON. 265, 268 (1977) (³We tend to think of the invention as the thing an 
inventor has made or accomplished, and the rule seems to imply the inventor is 
confined to that.´). This is not to say that patent boundaries or questions of validity 
or disclosure were necessarily simple, or that the concept of malleability that I 
describe here cannot be seen in nineteenth-century patent law. Rather, I¶m merely 
pointing out that viewing the invention as a fixed ³thing´ makes a great deal of 
sense if one considers the historical context from which the modern concept of ³the 
invention´ emerged.  
25. See Liivak, supra note 21, at 47 (³We have been taught that invention is
not the right way for the initiated to discuss patent law. The concrete usage of the 
invention, referring to the thing actually invented, has fallen victim to modern patent 
law¶s cult of the claim.´); Kitch, supra note 24, at 268 (³We tend to think of an 
invention as the thing an inventor has made or accomplished, and the rule seems to 
imply the inventor is confined to that. But the rule is misleading, because the 
invention as claimed in the patent claims and the physical embodiment of the 
invention are two quite different things.´).
26. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1021 (1989) 
[hereinafter Progress of Science] (emphases added) (footnote omitted).  
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In this explanation—and indeed, throughout the paper—
Eisenberg refers to “the invention” or “the patented invention.”27 
Read in the context of the paragraph above and the work as a whole, 
“the invention” operates as a stationary construct; it is the very thing 
that the patent holder is allowed to stop others from using. This 
reading, of course, flows naturally from the language of the statute 
itself. During the term of the patent,28 others cannot use “the same 
invention” without the patent holder’s permission. The problem that 
Eisenberg identifies is that this exclusive right is broad enough to 
penetrate even the sphere of basic research.29 The solution, then, is to 
develop a coherent and well-supported experimental use exception, 
one that has a “proper scope.”30  
Eisenberg’s treatment of “the invention” is representative. 
Countless commentators use the exact same phrase in the same 
way:31 as a shorthand to invoke a general understanding of a set of 
27. See, e.g., id. at 1022 (“In exchange for these exclusive rights, the patent
statute requires the inventor to disclose the invention in the patent application . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); id. at 1070 (“Exclusive patent rights are seen as an alternative to 
secrecy because patent protection makes secrecy impossible (by requiring disclosure 
of the invention in order to get a patent) and unnecessary (by conferring exclusive 
rights that survive disclosure).” (emphasis added)); id. at 1078 (“Research use of a 
patented invention with a primary or significant market among research users should 
not be exempt from infringement liability when the research user is an ordinary 
consumer of the patented invention.” (emphases added)). Each of these uses of “the 
invention” (or the “patented invention”) treats it as both a static concept to which the 
patent right exists in parallel. 
28. At the time Eisenberg wrote the Progress of Science article, the patent
term was seventeen years from issuance at the time. See CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE
LAW OF PATENTS 1 n.3 (3d ed. 2014). In 1995, the patent term of a patent was 
changed to twenty years from the filing date for applications filed on or after June 8, 
1995. Id. 
29. Progress of Science, supra note 26, at 1017-18.
30. Id. at 1022.
31. Continuing in the experimental-use-exception literature, writing a
decade later, Katherine Strandburg formulated the idea of self-disclosing and non-
self-disclosing inventions. See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? 
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 83 (2004). This 
work also speaks of the patent right in terms similar to that of Professor Eisenberg. 
“Patents” and “inventions” are, if not used almost interchangeably, then certainly 
equated with one another. See id. at 91 (“The effect patents have on technological 
progress is complicated because, in principle, most inventions have the potential to 
benefit society in two ways: (1) through their direct utility to the users or consumers 
of embodiments of the invention; and (2) through the use of the inventive idea as a 
springboard to further innovation.”). Interestingly, the pivotal case in What Does the 
Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, Madey v. Duke University, 
307 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002), involved a situation where there was no 
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fixed, if perhaps fuzzy and abstract, rights. Courts, too²particularly, 
the Supreme Court²draw upon this terminology, particularly when 
emphasizing the immutable nature of whatever is being patented.32
This stands to reason: After all, the patent statutes themselves invoke 
the term throughout. 
dispute that the accused infringer was using the literal embodiment of the claimed 
invention²it was, after all, Dr. Madey¶s own free electron laser that Duke was 
continuing to use. Here, then, it seems to make perfect sense to take a view of the 
patent right and the invention as being one and the same. 
 More recently yet, Jonas Anderson¶s work, which builds on 
Strandburg¶s idea of self- and non-self-disclosing inventions, constructs an 
analytical structure in which to neatly compartmentalize the question of whether 
innovations should be protected through patents or trade-secrecy laws. See J. Jonas 
Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 917, 921-21 (2011). While 
Anderson emphasizes the limits of patent law¶s current disclosure rules and the 
ability of patent holders to claim more than they disclose, he simultaneously speaks 
of the rights using the language of ³the invention´ or ³the innovation.´ See id. at 
941-45. The inference is that the patent rights are fixed and unchanging, or at least
not subject to change after issuance.
 I have, obviously, oversimplified each of these scholars¶ contributions 
to illustrate the idea of a relatively stationary patent right. They all possess a deep 
understanding of patent law and thus recognize how questions of validity and claim 
scope can, in practice, shift and move. But underlying much of the work in the field 
is a subconscious treatment of the patent right as fixed, one that manifests itself 
particularly through the language of ³the invention.´  
32. Consider, for example, the Court¶s discussion of patent rights in its
recent subject matter jurisprudence. There, the Court implicitly conceptualized ³the 
invention´ as a static construct for purposes of the subject matter eligibility inquiry. 
This is most striking in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 
2347 (2014), where the Court emphasized what it perceived as the ³substance´ of 
the claimed rights: 
Put another way, the system claims are no different from the 
method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea 
implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of 
generic computer components configured to implement the same idea. 
This Court has long ³warn[ed] . . . against´ interpreting § 101 ³in ways 
that make patent eligibility µdepend simply on the draftsman¶s art.¶´
Id. at 2360 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289, 1294 (2012)). The idea here is that there is some true ³invention,´ of which 
everything else is merely a shadow. This, too, is a manifestation of a view of patent 
rights as fixed, although it is very different from that taken by, say, the Federal 
Circuit. See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (concluding that meaningful limitations involving computers may make a 
claimed invention patent eligible) cert. granted, vacated, WildTangent, Inc. v. 
Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014); see also Christopher A. Cotropia, What 
is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 1861-62 (2012) (distinguishing 
between the ³external invention´ and the ³claim-centered invention´).
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As a second example of the language used to characterize 
patent rights, consider the classic rhetorical device in patent litigation 
discussed in the introduction: the “nose of wax”33 argument. The 
potency of this device is predicated on the idea that the patent right 
is—or at least, should be—immutable upon issuance. In its first 
appearance, Justice Bradley invoked this device to make clear that a 
claim in a patent may not “be turned and twisted in any direction, by 
merely referring to the specification, so as to make it include 
something more than, or something different from, what its words 
express.”34 In the years since, courts have drawn upon Bradley’s 
language to reject parties’ attempts to interpret claims one way for 
validity and another way for infringement;35 to reject attempts to use 
one claim meaning during the patent examination process and 
another in litigation;36 and to reiterate the basic idea that claims are 
not so mutable.37 Parties draw upon the device whenever they wish to 
push the theme that their opponents are departing from the “true” 
meaning of the claims.38 Treatise writers use the device to explain 
that there is “no ‘nose of wax’”: “the specification cannot be used to 
alter an otherwise clear meaning of a claim term.”39 The central idea 
underlying all of these examples is that the patent claim cannot 
possibly be understood as mutable; it is fixed at the time of issuance, 
and to depart from that principle is a legal error. 
Theories of patent law, too, inherently draw upon conceptions 
of patent rights as fixed. Indeed, the very calculations underlying the 
                                                     
 33. A search of WestlawNext for the terms (“nose of wax” /p patent) in the 
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit databases returns 265 briefs. My own anecdotal 
experience is that this terminology is invoked even more frequently in the district 
courts.  
 34. White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886). 
 35. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“A patent may not, like a ‘nose of wax,’ be twisted one way 
to avoid anticipation and another to find infringement.” (quoting Sterner Lighting, 
Inc. v. Allied Elec. Supply, Inc., 431 F.2d 539, 544 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
 36. See Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815, 819 
n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[A]n inventor may not be heard to proffer an interpretation 
that would alter the undisputed public record (claim, specification, prosecution 
history) and treat the claim as a ‘nose of wax.’” (citing Dunbar, 119 U.S. at 51)). 
 37. See Pratt & Whitney Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 838, 846-47 (Ct. Cl. 
1965) (“Courts have long held that a claim is not ‘like a nose of wax, which may be 
turned and twisted in any direction’ to make it include something not expressly 
recited.” (citing Dunbar, 119 U.S. at 51)). 
 38. See 2A BARRY KRAMER & ALLEN D. BRUFSKY, PATENT LAW PRACTICE 
FORMS § 77:7.10, Form 7(b)-6.1. 
 39. ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., 1 ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 5:6 (2010). 
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economics-based attempts to tweak and improve the patent system 
envision a patent that does not change once the proper rules are in 
place. Consider the economic explanation of patent rights offered by 
Richard Posner and William Landes. While their work recognizes 
the dynamic economic consequences of patents, it rests upon a 
conception of the rights themselves as something that is fixed at 
inception. In The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, 
Landes and Posner discuss how a “patent protects against any 
duplication of the patented invention.”40 They assert that a patent 
allows its holder to obtain the “full value of the invention”41 and that 
“patents protect ideas.”42 These characterizations draw upon the idea 
that the invention and the scope of rights are one, and that those 
rights are fixed at inception. More important than word choices, 
however, is their formal economic model of patents, which treats a 
patent as if it consists of exclusive rights over a particular new 
technology. The implication of the patent, Landes and Posner argue, 
is that the patented innovation impacts the cost structure, and thus 
the behavior of other firms competing in the market.43 This dynamic 
response, however, occurs even as the patent rights remain fixed; 
indeed, it would add another layer of complexity to Landes and 
Posner’s formal model if the nature of the patent rights themselves 
changed even as competitors engaged in their own strategic 
behaviors.  
The foregoing examples are not without a reasonable basis. 
Indeed, viewing patent rights as relatively certain and unchanging 
appears logical given the existence of a formally issued patent 
document coupled with its examination by a specialist at the federal 
government. After all, a patent seems to be a lot like a deed, except 
its subject is not land but technology.44 One just needs to read the 
document to know what technology it circumscribes.  
                                                     
 40. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 295 (2004). 
 41. Id. at 301. 
 42. Id. at 296. 
 43. Id. at 297-98 (describing a formal economic model of the effects of a 
process patent on market-cost structure). 
 44. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(en banc) (quoting Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. 437, 481-82 (1848)) (“[T]he 
specification is a ‘component part of the patent’ and ‘is as much to be considered 
with the [letters patent] in construing them, as any paper referred to in a deed or 
other contract.’”); In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (“The function of claims is (a) to point out what the invention is in such a 
way as to distinguish it from what was previously known, i.e., from the prior art; and 
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Yet, as I explain in the remainder of this Article, such a view of 
patent rights fundamentally misunderstands both the legal structures 
around which they are built and how those rights actually work.  
II. CERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY
The next two Parts lay out the central concept of this Article: 
the idea of malleability. The explanation draws on two axes: certain 
versus probabilistic and fixed versus malleable. The following image 
graphically presents the basic concept:  
While modern scholars recognize patent rights as probabilistic, 
they have yet to explore the malleability axis. But to understand 
malleability, and how it differs from the concept of probabilistic 
rights, it is first necessary to explain the concepts of certainty and 
probability. 
A. Certain Rights Versus Probabilistic Rights
Certainty is, at least on the surface, a straightforward concept: 
A result is certain when we are sure that it will occur. We are certain 
(b) to define the scope of protection afforded by the patent. In both of those aspects,
claims are not technical descriptions of the disclosed inventions but are legal
documents like the descriptions of lands by metes and bounds in a deed which
define the area conveyed but do not describe the land.” (emphases omitted));
Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 65 (2005) (“A claim
resembles a land description in a deed because it defines the exact area protected by
the legal instrument.”). But see Emily Michiko Morris, Res or Rules? Patents and
the (Uncertain) Rules of the Game, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 481, 494
(2012) (critiquing the conventional view of patent claims as property deeds).
Certain
Malleable 
Fixed 
Probabilistic 
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that the sun will rise in the east and set in the west, that day will 
follow night, and that water is wet. If one puts five blue marbles in 
an empty vase, and then draws out one marble, we can be certain that 
the marble will be blue. There are, unsurprisingly, epistemological 
disputes about what “certainty” is or should mean: Does it mean 
practical certainty? Or does it mean “absolute” certainty?45 In some 
legal contexts, this distinction might matter, such as when it comes to 
the level of proof for scientific facts.46 But for purposes of drawing 
the distinction between probabilistic and certain, the blue marble 
example should suffice. 
The diametric opposite of certainty would logically seem to be 
absolute uncertainty. Yet, humans have developed an array of 
strategies for dealing with uncertainty. It is rare when we cannot 
predict at all what might happen. Even when results are unknown, 
there is still a degree of knowledge as to what might happen. As a 
result, rather than expressing the opposite of certainty as uncertainty, 
it is better understood as being probabilistic.  
The basic idea of probability is that certain types of results are 
predictable—sort of. Put in more formal terms, probability refers to 
the idea that some results are more likely than others.47 What this 
means is that even though we cannot know the outcome of a 
particular event in advance, we can make predictions about what is 
likely to occur. Draw a card from a shuffled standard deck of playing 
cards and there’s a 25% chance it will be a diamond and a 50% 
chance it will be a red suit. Roll two standard dice and there is a 
4/36th chance that the result will add up to four.48  
Consider a variation of the blue-marble scenario described 
above: An opaque vase contains five blue marbles and ninety-five 
                                                     
 45. Compare JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 15 
(2010) (“There is no such thing as absolute certainty, but there is assurance 
sufficient for the purposes of human life.”), with RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON 
METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 19 (Donald A. Cress trans., 3d ed. 
1993) (developing a philosophical framework that is based on only that which is 
absolutely certain: “cogito ergo sum”).  
 46. Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1155-66 (2014) (discussing concepts of certainty in the context 
of patent-eligible subject matter); Steve C. Gold, When Certainty Dissolves into 
Probability: A Legal Vision of Toxic Causation for the Post-Genomic Era, 70 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237, 251 (2013) (discussing standards of evidentiary proof in 
the context of toxic torts). 
 47. DAVID S. MOORE, THE BASIC PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 262 (5th ed. 
2010) (explaining that “chance behavior is unpredictable in the short run but has a 
regular and predictable pattern in the long run”). 
 48. Id. at 267. 
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red marbles; the marbles are otherwise identical. A player must reach 
into the vase and draw five marbles out without looking to see what 
color they are. Assuming that we know, ex ante, the contents of the 
vase, then we know that only specific outcomes are possible. The 
player might draw five blue marbles, but she certainly won’t draw 
five green marbles. We can also make more detailed predictions of 
possible outcomes. For example, the chance of drawing five blue 
marbles is quite low, and the chance of drawing five red marbles is 
reasonably high. The result is thus probabilistic: We don’t know for 
certain what’s going to happen, but we have a pretty good idea about 
what’s probably going to happen.  
B. Patent Rights as Probabilistic Rights 
The idea that patent rights are probabilistic is one that has 
gained traction in recent years49 and is fairly well accepted today.50 In 
their 2005 work, Probabilistic Patents, Mark Lemley and Carl 
Shapiro identified two dimensions of uncertainty: “1) uncertainty 
about the commercial significance of the invention being patented, 
and 2) uncertainty about the validity and scope of the legal right 
                                                     
 49. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 12, at 75. Lemley and Shapiro’s work 
represents a move towards formalizing the longstanding understanding that patent 
rights (like many other forms of rights) involve some degree of uncertainty. See, 
e.g., Wm. Redin Woodward, Folk: Patents and Industrial Progress, 56 HARV. L. 
REV. 672, 675 (1943) (reviewing GEORGE E. FOLK, PATENTS AND INDUSTRIAL 
PROGRESS (1942)) (referring to the “‘uncertainty principle’ resulting from the fact 
that the grant of a patent, as a decision on novelty and inventiveness, is tentative to a 
degree not true of most other administrative and judicial decisions”); Case 
Comment, Costs of Patent Infringement Litigation May Be Expensed, 103 U. PA. L. 
REV. 975, 978 (1955) (“The complexity of many patents and the difficulty 
frequently encountered in tracing and determining the ‘prior art’ result in uncertainty 
and invite controversy regarding the permissible bounds of many patent claims.” 
(footnote omitted)); Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in 
Patent Litigation: The Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction 
Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 175 (2001); Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, 
Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The 
Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
985, 987 (1999). In addition to recognizing the uncertainty present in asserting a 
patent (indeed, their argument is that certain types of this uncertainty may actually 
be economically beneficial), Ayres and Klemperer introduce a reductive 
“probabilistic patent” regime to model the consequences of this uncertainty. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Why Barring Settlement Bars Legitimate 
Suits: A Reply to Rosenberg and Shavell, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 81 
(2008) (referring to the “probability of success” of winning a patent lawsuit). 
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being granted.”51 Given these uncertainties, Lemley and Shapiro 
describe patents as “lottery tickets”: “Inventors who are uncertain of 
the commercial significance of their ideas seek to patent many of 
them anyway, knowing that most of the resulting patents will turn 
out to be worthless, but hoping that a few will pay off big-time.”52 
For purposes of understanding the legal rights that patents 
embody, however, it is important to distinguish between the two 
uncertainties that Lemley and Shapiro identify. While commercial 
significance is an important consideration when weighing the effect 
of a patent, it is the second form of uncertainty that they point to—
uncertainty about the validity and scope of the legal right—that most 
directly implicates the idea that patent rights can be probabilistic.53  
This probabilistic nature of patent rights involves uncertainties 
at a number of points. Each patent claim gives the patent owner the 
exclusive right to make, use, offer for sale, or sell within the United 
States or import into the United States the invention,54 which the law 
has long held to mean the invention as defined by the claims.55 The 
patent applicant (or in most cases, the applicant’s attorney) drafts the 
claims and proposes them to a patent examiner, who reviews them 
for various patentability requirements.56 The examiner issues the 
patent with its claims if all substantive and procedural requirements 
are met.57  
                                                     
 51. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 12, at 76. 
 52. Id. at 81. 
 53. Indeed, Lemley and Shapiro expressly refer to the “legal right” with this 
form of uncertainty. See id. at 76. 
 54. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 271(a) (2012). There are other statutorily 
specified acts of infringement, but for purposes of the discussion these will suffice. 
 55. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (2005) (en banc) (noting 
the “‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the 
invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude’ . . . [which] has been 
recognized since at least 1836” (citations omitted)); see also Markman v. Westview, 
F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The written description part of the specification 
itself does not delimit the right to exclude. That is the function and purpose of 
claims.”); Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 
1272, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“Claim construction is a legal statement of 
the scope of the patent right [that turns on] the content of the patent documents.”). 
 56. See generally NARD, supra note 28, at 39-49 (detailing the process of 
obtaining a patent). 
 57. See MPEP ch. 2100 (9th ed. Mar. 2014); see also NARD, supra note 28, 
at 45.  
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This process is hardly perfect; indeed, it is unlikely that it ever 
could be.58 Each year the patent office grants hundreds of thousands 
of patents containing multiple claims.59 Each examiner spends, on 
average, fewer than twenty hours examining a patent.60 And while 
examiners can competently handle some aspects of the examination 
process,61 other aspects can be more challenging, such as areas where 
the law is in flux,62 areas where guidance only exists as high level,63 
                                                     
 58. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1495, 1497 (2001) (“Because so few patents are ever asserted against a 
competitor, it is much cheaper for society to make detailed validity determinations 
in those few cases than to invest additional resources examining patents that will 
never be heard from again. In short, the PTO doesn’t do a very detailed job of 
examining patents, but we probably don’t want it to.”). 
 59. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2013, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2015).  
 60. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 15 (2009). This amount goes down as examiners become 
more senior. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and 
Patent Office Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STATS. 817, 817 (2012); see also Michael 
Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Grant 
Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 
669 (proposing reasons that senior examiners spend less time per application than 
junior examiners). In addition, Wasserman and Frakes found the reduction in time 
offset any increase in examining ability due to greater experience. Id. 
 61. In particular, the compliance with certain technical requirements of 
claim drafting such as the requirement for antecedent basis. MPEP § 2173.05(e) 
(9th ed. Mar. 2014) (describing how a claim is indefinite due to lack of antecedent 
basis and how an examiner should correct it); see also id. § 2173.05 (providing a list 
of technical issues frequently raised in examination process and guidance to resolve 
them).  
 62. Such as patent-eligible subject matter. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(overturning the district court’s summary judgment granted to the Patent Office that 
held isolated DNA was ineligible subject matter), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013) (holding synthetically created cDNA patent eligible subject matter); see also 
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (affirming the Patent 
Office’s decision to reject a business method patent application but “conclud[ing] 
that the ‘useful, concrete and tangible result’ inquiry is inadequate and reaffirm[ing] 
that the machine-or-transformation test outlined by the Supreme Court is the proper 
test to apply), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 
(2010) (affirming the patent rejection but holding “[t]he Court of Appeals 
incorrectly concluded that this Court has endorsed the machine-or-transformation 
test as the exclusive test”); Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 987 (C.C.P.A. 1979) 
(overturning the Patent Office’s decision that manmade, genetically engineered 
bacterium is not patent eligible), aff’d sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
303 (1980).  
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searches for nonpatent prior art, and possibly novel strategic 
behaviors for seeking broad claim scope.64 No one seriously contends 
that the patent office gets it right all the time. We know that at least 
some patents are invalidated by the courts,65 which logically are in a 
better position to assess the true validity and scope of the patent due 
to superior information and a longer time to ponder the issues.66
The result is that a patent claim, when it issues, may or may not 
actually be valid. To be sure, it is imbued with a presumption of 
validity,67 but that is only a presumption, not an incontestable 
proposition. To figure out whether a patent claim is really valid 
requires a substantial undertaking; and even then, one can never be 
certain. A court might reject patent invalidity in one suit, but another 
court might reach the opposite result.68 Furthermore, validity is 
measured in several dimensions: newness (novelty and 
63. Such as patent-eligible subject matter. See, e.g., Interim Guidance for
Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View of Bilski v. 
Kappos, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/ 
bilski_guidance.jsp (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (follow hyperlinks under the ³July 
27, 2010 Memorandum to the Examining Corps´ and ³101 Method Eligibility Quick 
Reference Sheet´).
64. Such as the rise of functional claiming. Dennis Crouch, Functional
Claim Language in Issued Patents, PATENTLY-O, http://patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2014/01/functional-language-patents.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (reporting an 
increase of certain types of language associated with claiming function in issued 
patents despite a decrease in means-plus-function claims); see generally Mark A. 
Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L.
REV. 905 (2013).  
65. John R. Allison, Mark. A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding
the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1801 (2014) 
(reporting a litigation invalidation rate of 43% during the study period). 
66. See Lemley, supra note 58, at 1513 (comparing the amount of time
available to the patent office and the courts when making determinations about a 
patent). Of course, it may be that patent examiners are in the better position to reach 
a ³true´ determination of validity given their firsthand technical expertise, 
something that courts and juries typically do not possess. 
67. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (³A patent shall be presumed valid. Each
claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) 
shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims; dependent or 
multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an 
invalid claim.´).
68. Compare Univ. of Ill. Found. v. Winegard Co., 402 F.2d 125, 129
(8th Cir. 1968) (holding the patent No. 3,210,767 invalid as obvious), with Univ. of 
Ill. Found. v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., 422 F.2d 769, 778 (7th Cir. 1970) (holding 
patent No. 3,210,767 not invalid), vacated, 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971). 
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nonobviousness), adequate disclosure (enablement and written 
description), utility, and subject matter eligibility.69  
Uncertainties over defining the claim scope add to the 
probabilistic nature of patent rights.70 Claim construction is one of 
the most volatile aspects of patent law, and entire forests of paper 
and oceans of ink have been dedicated to its cause.71 The Federal 
Circuit has issued four en banc opinions on claim construction in the 
last twenty years,72 and claim construction remains one of (if not the) 
most central issues in nearly all patent infringement disputes.73 There 
are many reasons why this is so,74 but suffice it to say that 
                                                     
 69. For example, “[t]he laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas have been held not patentable.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 
(1980). 
 70. This might be more precisely described as a form of indeterminacy 
rather than of probability, but regardless of the precise articulation, what is 
important for purposes of this paper is simply that the idea that patent scopes can be 
uncertain for reasons beyond the parties’ immediate control. For my comment on the 
indeterminacy–probabilistic distinction, see supra notes 12-15 and accompanying 
text.  
 71. See, e.g., NARD, supra note 28, at 512-17 (discussing practical issues of 
claim construction and listing scholars who have commented); see also Lighting 
Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (en banc) (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (“Criticism of and debate over Cybor 
have been widespread since it issued—not only among legal scholars and patent 
practitioners, but also among members of this court.”). 
 72. Id. at 1276; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1310 (2005) 
(en banc); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(en banc); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en banc). And despite the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Teva v. Sandoz 
that “subsidiary facts” in claim construction are entitled to deference by the Federal 
Circuit, the Federal Circuit’s approach to reviewing claim construction remains 
largely unchanged. See Jason Rantanen, Fenner v. Cellco: Judge Newman Speaks on 
Claim Construction, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 15, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2015/02/fenner-speaks-construction.html. 
 73. NARD, supra note 28, at 61 & n.7 (“[I]n the context of litigation, once 
claims are interpreted, issues of validity and infringement are largely foregone 
conclusions.”). 
 74. For a discussion of why claim construction remains a challenging 
enterprise, see Jason Rantanen, Reading Patent Law: A Review of Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts, 6 LANDSLIDE 50, 52-53 (2013) (book review). For 
another perspective on why claim construction is so volatile, see Tun-Jen Chiang & 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 
YALE L. J. 530, 533-35 (2013) (arguing that the uncertainty in how claims are 
applied is due to policy disagreements about the underlying goals of claim 
construction as opposed to ambiguous language). 
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uncertainties over the meaning of claim terms add yet more 
uncertainty to the probabilistic nature of patent rights.75  
Many of these uncertainties flow from incomplete information: 
incomplete information about what prior art might be out there and 
incomplete information about how particular words might be 
interpreted by a person of skill in the relevant technological art. 
Incomplete information also stems from uncertainties over the 
technological makeup of the infringing product itself. But 
uncertainty involves more than imperfect information. Many issues 
in patent law involve not only what the information is, but also how 
it is analyzed in conjunction with the patent.76 Decision-makers can 
differ, for example, on issues of claim construction even when 
looking at the same evidence.77 In the end, patents involve questions 
to which it is impossible to know answers with absolute certainty.78 
The idea of patents as being probabilistic, then, is one that 
cannot be seriously disputed from a practical perspective.79 Patents 
                                                     
 75. Alan Devlin, Indeterminism and the Property-Patent Equation, 28 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 75-80 (2009) (explaining that claim terms’ indeterminate 
scope contributes to uncertainty). 
 76. There is a view that how decision-makers will decide particular 
questions is a form of information, too. See, e.g., Sichelman, supra note 50, at 81 
(observing that “the probability of success is a continuous function that becomes 
more accurate over the course of a case”). And I agree that it can certainly be 
viewed that way. But thinking of analytical reasoning as a form of information takes 
us down the rabbit hole into a world where everything is just information, a fall that 
doesn’t provide much useful structure to grasp. For this reason, I think that it’s 
conceptually helpful to differentiate between information about what evidence is out 
there and information about a particular judge’s analytical preferences. And, 
curiously, there is an unquestionably probabilistic component here: District judges, 
it turns out, are usually randomly assigned to cases. The majority of courts use some 
variation of a random drawing. See FAQs: Filing a Case, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-filing-case (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (explaining 
that, in assigning judges to cases, “[t]he majority of courts use some variation of a 
random drawing”). And so which decision-maker will actually get a given case is 
inherently probabilistic.  
 77. See, e.g., GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 
1315 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Reyna, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(disagreeing as to the interpretation of the claim terms “‘substantially ellipsoidal 
inner profile’” and “‘generally spherical outer profile’”). 
 78. See Sichelman, supra note 50, at 81-88. 
 79. Although one could take the epistemological position that there is an 
“absolute truth” of the validity and scope of patents, the existence of such an 
absolute truth only matters if humans are in a position to arrive at it. But, 
unfortunately perhaps, we as human beings are limited by our human perception and 
understanding. Thus, to the extent there is an absolute truth, that absolute truth is 
irrelevant. The best we can do is make a probabilistic assessment of that truth.  
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are now well understood as involving highly variable rights²
probabilistic rights²that may or may not be valid, and whose degree 
of validity is not known with certainty.80 In contrasting patent rights 
with traditional property rights, for example, Alan Devlin observes 
that ³[t]he world of patent law is different. For those unfamiliar with 
the nature of prosecution at the Patent and Trademark Office . . . and 
the reality of patent litigation, the level of uncertainty underlying 
such intellectual property rights is astonishing.´81
Patent rights can even be extended beyond the literal scope of 
the claims, although this is marshy ground. The doctrinal mechanism 
involved is the ³doctrine of equivalents,´ which ³protects [the 
patentee] against efforts of copyists to evade liability for 
infringement by making only insubstantial changes to a patented 
invention.´82 Application of the doctrine of equivalents is a complex 
area of patent law, with numerous limitations83 and substantial
uncertainties.84 But it lends yet more variability to the already highly 
uncertain nature of patent rights. 
80. JOHN W. SCHLICHER, SETTLEMENT OF PATENT LITIGATION AND
DISPUTES: IMPROVING DECISIONS AND AGREEMENTS TO SETTTLE AND LICENSE 15-27
(2011) (outlining settlement models based on, in part, the probability a patent will be 
held invalid); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 12, at 80-87; see also EXECUTIVE 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 4-6 (2013) 
[hereinafter ³PRESIDENT¶S COUNCIL´], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/docs/patent_report.pdf (noting that PAEs often acquire patents with unclear 
claim boundaries); Devlin, supra note 75, at 75-80 (explaining how probabilistic 
validity contributes to uncertainty). 
81. Devlin, supra note 75, at 75.
82. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
727 (2002). 
83. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 26-41
(1997) (affirming the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel and holding that the 
doctrine of equivalents ³be applied to individual elements of a claim, not to the 
invention as a whole´ and not be ³allowed such broad play as to effectively 
eliminate that element in its entirety´
84. Festo, 535 U.S. at 727 (³[W]e appreciated that by extending protection
beyond the literal terms in a patent the doctrine of equivalents can create substantial 
uncertainty about where the patent monopoly ends. If the range of equivalents is 
unclear, competitors may be unable to determine what is a permitted alternative to a 
patented invention and what is an infringing equivalent.´ (citations omitted)). As 
one example, in 2007, John Allison and Mark Lemley wrote an article entitled The 
(Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, which reported empirical data 
indicating that the doctrine of equivalents was near death, and equivalents claims 
usually failed. 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 958 (2007). Yet, as of 2013, patent owners still 
experience some success with the doctrine of equivalents. Dennis Crouch, Doctrine 
of Equivalents: On the Rise Again?, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 21, 2013), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/02/doctrine-of-equivalents-on-the-rise.html.  
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All of these discussions about the probabilistic nature of patent 
rights, however, come from the perspective of those rights as fixed. 
Consider, for example, the common analogy of patent rights to 
lottery tickets.85 When one buys a lottery ticket, one has a certain 
probability of winning. That ticket gives the holder a probabilistic 
right to win. The ticket owner can do nothing to alter that 
probability. Indeed, the only strategies for enhancing one’s chances 
of winning are to buy more tickets86 or join a lottery pool.87 That right 
is thus probabilistic, but fixed. 
Unlike the owner of a lottery ticket, however, a patent holder 
has the ability to actually change the probabilities in its favor.88 At its 
most extreme, consider the following: A patent in the hands of most 
people is simply a fancy piece of paper, perhaps with some technical 
information in it. But in the hands of the right person—a patent 
litigator, for example—that patent becomes a potent weapon of 
exclusionary rights. That right is not fixed; it is malleable. 
III. FIXED VERSUS MALLEABLE 
A. The Concept of Malleability 
Malleability refers to a different idea than probability. A 
malleable right is one that can be altered after it has come into 
existence. The right is not fixed, but rather can be changed in some 
meaningful way.  
To illustrate how rules can be malleable, we can alter the blue-
marble example given above by giving the player the option of 
drawing fewer or more than five marbles. We can now say that the 
rule requiring the player to draw five marbles is malleable. If the 
goal of the game is to draw five blue marbles, the player will choose 
to draw 100 marbles, thus ensuring that she draws the five blue 
marbles. On the other hand, if the goal is to draw no blue marbles, 
the player will choose to draw no marbles at all. It should be 
apparent from this example that malleability can give a great deal of 
power to those who can take advantage: Depending on the game’s 
                                                     
 85. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 12, at 80-83. 
 86. Which from a rational perspective is a poor strategy, since the risk-
adjusted value of winning doesn’t change if you buy more lottery tickets. 
 87. This doesn’t change the risk-adjusted value of winning either. 
 88. I give this perspective for the sake of illustration only. Equally 
important, as I discuss below, is the ability of an accused infringer or other patent 
challenger to push inward on the patent scope or validity of a patent. 
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goal, the player’s ability to modify the draw rule could result in an 
automatic win or loss.89  
Malleability need not be complete to be potent, either. Even if 
the player’s ability to modify the draw rule is constrained (for 
example, the player may choose how many marbles to draw, but 
must draw at least one and may draw no more than ten), the player 
has a substantial advantage over another player who is forced to 
draw a fixed number of marbles.  
In understanding the concept of malleability, it is important to 
understand what it does not mean. First, malleability does not 
encompass private modifications of rights among two or more parties 
with respect to one another. Such changes occur constantly through 
contract: One party agrees to perform or abstain from performing 
some act in return for the other party performing or abstaining from 
performing some act of its own.90 Private modifications of rights may 
change the legal relationship among the parties vis-à-vis one another, 
but they do not change the legal scope of those rights against the 
world. For example, a merchant may sell a particular good, say, a 
violin, to a buyer. In doing so, the merchant has transferred various 
rights relating to the violin to the buyer in return for, presumably, 
money. In this situation, the parties have indeed altered each other’s 
respective legal positions: The buyer now has rights in the violin that 
are good against the world, and the seller no longer has such rights. 
Yet, what the parties have not done is change the legal scope of those 
rights with respect to the rest of the world. The parties cannot agree 
through this transaction, for example, that the buyer now has rights 
to all violins in the entire world.91 And while they can slice the 
transfer of rights in various ways (say, by leasing the violin rather 
than selling it), those rights still have the same form with respect to 
third parties. Upon leasing the violin, for example, the lessee has a 
right of possession that is good against the world. But no amount of 
agreement between the violin lessor and lessee can give the lessee 
                                                     
 89. For true probability geeks, the best example is the Monty Hall problem, 
in which having the ability to switch doors after a losing door is opened raises one’s 
chance of winning from 33% to 66%. See Steve Selvin, Letters to the Editor: A 
Problem in Probability, 29 AM. STATISTICIAN 67-71 (1975); Steve Selvin, Letters to 
the Editor: On the Monty Hall Problem, 29 AM. STATISTICIAN 134, 134 (1975). 
 90. See Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
“contract” as “[a]n agreement between two or more parties creating obligations that 
are enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law”). 
 91. Assuming, of course, that the seller does not actually have rights to all 
the violins in the world.  
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permission to play in Carnegie Hall without the assent of the people 
who run Carnegie Hall. 
Malleability, on the other hand, exists when legal rules that 
affect the world can be modified by individual actors. In the 
preceding example, if the violin seller were also a dictator with the 
power to change the rules about who was allowed to play where on a 
whim, we might say that those rules are malleable. This further 
illustrates a key difference between private modifications of rights 
and the concept of malleability: Malleability needs only the 
participation of one party. Put another way, a malleable right is one 
whose contours can be altered by a single actor operating by itself.92  
Nor does malleability refer to the idea that legal rules can be 
changed by other legal rules. A statute can be amended by legislative 
action; it can be declared unconstitutional; its effect can be altered by 
regulations issued by an agency. A common law rule can be 
superseded by statute; it can be overruled by a higher court; it can be 
impacted by administrative action. These macro-level changes can 
affect the scope of individual rights. Consider, for example, the 
provision in the America Invents Act that, for all practical purposes, 
invalidated patents on tax evasion strategies.93 Such changes are not 
made by an actor operating within the legal system; they are made by 
an actor or actors operating on the legal system itself. It is thus not an 
example of malleability. 
This is not to say that legal rules and changes to those legal 
rules cannot affect the degree to which rights may be malleable. To 
the contrary, the structure of a given set of legal rights can 
significantly impact the extent to which those rights are malleable. 
Patents, in particular, involve legal structures that tend to enhance 
their malleability.  
                                                     
 92. As my colleague Paul Gowder pointed out, to the extent that high 
degrees of malleability are present in particular legal rights, it could have substantial 
implications for work on the rule of law. But such implications are well beyond the 
scope of this piece.  
 93. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 14, 125 
Stat. 284, 327 (2011) (stating that “[f]or purposes of evaluating an invention under 
section 102 or 103 of title 35, United States Code, any strategy for reducing, 
avoiding, or deferring tax liability, whether known or unknown at the time of the 
invention or application for patent, shall be deemed insufficient to differentiate a 
claimed invention from the prior art”). For a discussion of the AIA’s impact on tax 
strategy patents, see Nichelle Closson, Tax Strategy Patents After the America 
Invents Act: The Need for Judicial Action, 38 J. CORP. L. 159, 160 (2012). 
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B. Patent Rights as Malleable Rights  
Applying this understanding of malleability, when I say that 
patent rights are malleable, I mean that their scope and strength can 
be altered by actors interacting with those rights even after the 
government has issued that right. A patent owner is able to broaden 
the patent’s scope after issuance or make it less likely to be declared 
invalid. And, on the other side, an accused infringer has the capacity 
to make the patent more likely invalid or diminish the possible scope 
of the patent; to shrink the effective space over which the patent 
grants a right to exclude. All of this occurs post-grant—in other 
words, once the patent right has been examined and comes into being 
as a legal right—and thus it is the right itself whose shape is being 
altered. This is the essence of malleability. 
The next few Sections explain how the law permits patent 
scope to be adjusted after its grant. I begin by addressing the 
perception that patents are rights over discrete, disclosed 
“inventions.” This view, I argue, is misguided. At best, patent rights 
can be perceived as being on an elastic leash tied to the technological 
disclosure of the patent. And that leash can stretch and contract even 
after the patent is issued. For example, claim meaning is not fixed in 
stone at the moment of patent issuance, but rather it can be pushed 
and pulled and altered by skillful argument. Nor is claim meaning 
the only boundary that parties can alter. The structure of patent 
claims themselves further enhances the malleability of patent rights, 
as do statutory rights of amendment post-grant.94  
C. The Elastic Leash on Patent Claims 
The perspective that patent rights are fixed often arises from 
the assumption that patent rights are rights over a discrete unit of 
                                                     
 94. I have structured the following Sections in a way that highlights the 
ability of parties acting ex post to uncouple the scope of the claims from the 
technological disclosure of the patent. An alternative way to think about these 
Sections, however, is in terms of what the invention is. One view of the invention is 
that it is what the inventor invented as set out in the disclosure. See, e.g., Liivak, 
supra note 21, at 12-14; Timothy Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. 
REV. 123, 128 (2011). A second view is that the claims define the invention. See 
Liivak, supra note 21, at 6-8. These divergent views lead to differing conceptions of 
the patent right as either the disclosure-as-invention or the claims-as-invention. The 
following sections demonstrate, however, that regardless of which way one views 
the patent right, the important point is that both incarnations are malleable. In other 
words, malleability does not depend on how one defines “the invention.”  
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technology—typically characterized as the technological teachings 
of the patent document itself—that was either invented by the 
inventor and then appropriated, perhaps unfairly, or was 
independently invented by another.95  
Richard Epstein’s approach to patents presents a strong 
example of this perspective. Epstein’s view treats patents as modular 
units that are, in many ways, akin to tangible property.96 Patents are 
not simply exclusive rights, but are more like mutually exclusive 
rights: rivalrous with respect to other patents and the public domain. 
Put another way, allowing an invention to be patented takes nothing 
away from what the public already has. The patent merely grants a 
right over something new that the public did not previously have 
access to. To analogize, if one magically transforms a one-acre 
common field to a two-acre field, then granting the creator an 
exclusive right to that new acre takes nothing away from anyone 
else. Rather, it gives the public access to something new that would 
not exist but for the patentee’s act. 
                                                     
 95. As an example, see Peter Detkin’s story of Dr. Cunningham, which I 
discuss in more detail in Jason Rantanen, How Malleability Matters, IP THEORY 
(forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2623711. A central point in that story is that 
“[i]n a perfect world Dr. Cunningham would be compensated for his time, talent, 
and investment; the manufacturers would get a technology to advance their business; 
and the public would get better computers.” Peter N. Detkin, Leveling the Playing 
Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 636, 639 (2007). Patents and their 
underlying technology are tightly linked in this narrative. As another example, 
consider Patrick Ennis’s blog post at Intellectual Ventures (IV) entitled Patents are 
Recipes, Not Monopolies, on Invention, in which he comments that “[i]t’s important 
to remember that patents only confer the right to exclude others from using your 
exact invention.” Patrick Ennis, Patents Are Recipes, Not Monopolies, on Invention, 
INTELL. VENTURES (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.intellectualventures.com/ 
insights/archives/patents-recipes-not-monopolies-on-invention. This is not to 
suggest that IV is the only entity making such a move; conflation of the technology 
with the patent rights itself is a key move in all efficient invention narratives.  
 96. Such a thread runs through much of Professor Epstein’s views about the 
patent system, from business method patents to pharmaceuticals to software. See 
Richard A. Epstein, Trolling for “Patent Trolls”, HOOVER INSTITUTION (June 11, 
2013), http://www.hoover.org/research/trolling-patent-trolls; Rod Cooper, Richard 
A. Epstein, & Stephen Haber, Patent Nonsense, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Jan. 25, 
2013), http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/138511; IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law, Debate About the Patent System, YOUTUBE (May 1, 
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AYLyXJTE2aI (beginning at about 35 
minutes); Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Movement and Intellectual 
Property, 30 REG. 58, 62 (2008). This is not to say that Epstein’s view is that patents 
and land are exactly the same; but rather, that they are close enough for purposes of 
treating them in largely the same way. Nor is this to say that Epstein conceives of 
land in simplistic, Blackstonian terms—he clearly does not. See id. at 59.  
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Consider the following example of a patent for a new 
transistor.97 The patent consists of a discrete package of information 
and rights surrounding this new transistor. If a radio manufacturer 
wants to legally employ this patented transistor in its products, it will 
find the inventor and negotiate a license. If, on the other hand, the 
improvement does not represent a significant commercial advantage 
over freely available alternatives, such as those for which patents 
have expired, then the manufacturer will not adopt the new 
technology. Even if the manufacturer independently develops the 
technology (but is second to do so and not entitled to patent rights), 
the manufacturer will either pay for the license once it becomes 
aware of the patent holder’s rights or switch to the most 
economically efficient substitute. In this way, patents and 
technologies are equivalent. A patent is nothing more than a legal 
right over a specific new technology.98  
As a second illustration, consider James McDonough III’s 
argument in The Myth of the Patent Troll, in which he asserts that 
“the activities of patent dealers in their pure form benefit society.”99 
                                                     
 97. Which, to be clear, is not from Professor Epstein himself, but is rather 
to illustrate my own interpretation of his view. See Jason Rantanen, PatCon 3: 
Posner/Epstein Debate on the Patent System, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 12, 2013), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04/patcon-3-posnerepstein-debate-on-the-patent-
system.html. 
 98. That said, Professor Epstein’s position does account for some 
malleability in the right that arises through the doctrine of equivalents. Indeed, he 
commented to me that the doctrine of equivalents plays a key role in his view 
because “it deals with the risk of circumvention of the patent by strategic 
substitution that comes from imitation and variation and not independent variance.” 
See also Richard A. Epstein, Reflections on the Historical Origins and Economic 
Structure of the Law Merchant, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (2004) (discussing the 
doctrine of equivalents). In other words, the doctrine of equivalents allows the patent 
right to encompass activities when copying is involved but excludes them when it is 
not. The patent right can sometimes stretch and sometimes not stretch. Indeed, the 
case law explicitly recognizes this potential for lawyer argument over copying 
affecting the application of the doctrine of equivalents and attempts to foreclose it. 
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 36 (1997) (“The 
better view, and the one consistent with Graver Tank’s predecessors and the 
objective approach to infringement, is that intent plays no role in the application of 
the doctrine of equivalents.”). However, practical outcomes may tell another story. 
Cf. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. 
REV. 1421, 1452-54 (2009) (finding that allegations of copying are rare in patent 
infringement suits, even when willful infringement is raised).  
 99. James McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative 
View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L. J. 189, 
204 (2006) (emphasis omitted). McDonough III’s comment is significant because it 
922 Michigan State Law Review  2015:895 
His analysis conflates the patent right and the underlying technology. 
McDonough makes this move by directly linking “the invention” to 
the patent right:  
This fact [the nonrivalrous nature of ideas] makes expropriation of the 
patent easy because another person can easily use an invention without the 
patent holder knowing. The patent system specifically attempts to 
ameliorate this problem by granting property entitlements in the 
innovation through excludability.100 
Linking “the invention” to the patent right (“property entitlements” 
and “excludability”) is critical to McDonough’s thesis because it 
allows a shift from the general concept of a “market for ideas”101 to a 
“legitimate patent market,” where “[p]atent dealers operate . . . by 
buying and licensing patents.”102 After all, the patent right simply 
secures the exclusive right to that particular invention, and given that 
linkage, it only makes sense that it can be bought and sold.103  
Even those who are skeptical of such entities tend to treat the 
patent rights and “the invention”—that is, the technological 
disclosure of the patent—as equivalent. Consider Fiona Scott-
Morton and Carl Shapiro’s articulation of patent assertion entities’ 
(PAE) behavior:  
 An inventor has discovered and patented valuable technology . . . . She 
sells her patent to a PAE [patent assertion entity] that is skilled at finding 
downstream firms to whom the technology can be transferred. The PAE 
also is good at locating unscrupulous firms that have copied the patented 
technology and are using it without paying.104  
Although their model recognizes that the goal of “PAEs is to 
enhance the monetization of the patents they acquire,”105 it implicitly 
                                                                                                                
is one of, if not the, earliest sophisticated defenses of the emerging patent 
monetization strategies. 
 100. Id. at 206 (emphases added) (footnote omitted). 
 101. Id. at 204. 
 102. Id. at 207. 
 103. So compelling is this concept of an “invention marketplace” that as of 
early 2014, IV was including it as part of its primary self-identity. See This is What 
Creating an Invention Marketplace Looks Like, INTELL. VENTURES, 
http://www.intellectualventures.com/about/invention-marketplace (last visited Sept. 
18, 2015). As with others, IV treats the patents and inventions as one and the same, 
which makes the marketplace concept seem even more logical.  
 104. Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions 10 
(Working Paper, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2288911 (emphases added). 
 105. Id. at 14. 
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relies on a rigid connection between the invention and the scope of 
the patent rights themselves.106
*   *   *
The assumption that patent rights are merely rights over a 
specific technology draws upon an erroneous view of patent rights as 
merely being a fence around the technological disclosure of the 
patent. Either those rights are actually rights over the technological 
disclosure of the patent, or they are not (in which case the rights are 
invalid).  
But it turns out patents are not merely the rights to 
embodiments of technologies. Rather, they are a set of exclusive 
rights that, while linked in some sense to a technological disclosure 
of an invention, are hardly just a set of plans for making and using 
that new invention that require payment to use.107 Nor are the 
exclusive rights conveyed by a patent limited to the specific 
embodiments that the patent discloses; to the contrary, patent rights 
are expressly not limited to these embodiments.108 And not only are 
patent rights not literally limited to the disclosure, but patent law has 
106. The farthest that Morton and Shapiro move away from this assumption
is in their observation that PAEs may do little or no technology transfer and 
conclude that the value of the technology may be greater than the value that the PAE 
can extract from the downstream firm. See id. ³When the PAE takes a share of the 
downstream firm¶s profits that exceed the value of the licensed technology, the 
downstream firm¶s share of its own operating profits is necessarily reduced . . . .´ Id.
Ultimately, however, this is not their primary focus (although in my view their 
model would be enhanced by including a parameter that accounts for the extent to 
which the PAE can expand the scope of the patent rights). 
107. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360-61
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting ³µa considerable amount of experimentation¶´ to practice 
the patented invention is not fatal to the enablement requirement) (quoting PPG 
Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996))); 
Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg, Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 
Aug. 11, 1997) (noting ³we have never held that a patent must disclose information 
sufficient to manufacture a commercial product incorporating the invention´); 
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 560-62 (2009) (noting a 
³good deal of evidence suggests that technologists do not find that [a patent 
document] contains pertinent information for their research´).
108. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320 (2005) (en banc) (³[O]ne
of the cardinal sins of patent law [is] reading a limitation from the written 
description into the claims.´ (quoting SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001))). Even if the claims 
are means-plus-function claims, their scope encompasses not just what is literally 
described in the specification, but also equivalents thereof. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) 
(2012). 
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also developed doctrines that extend the scope of claims beyond 
even what they literally encompass.109 
To be sure, patent law does contain a mechanism that seeks to 
maintain a link between the inventor’s technological disclosure and 
the scope of the exclusive rights granted by the patent.110 And that 
requirement acts as a leash on the possible scope of claims. But it is 
merely a leash, not a fence; that leash often seems to be made of 
elastic rather than metal chains.111  
The main112 patent law mechanism that ties the underlying 
invention to the scope of exclusive rights is comprised of a set of 
doctrines that can be collectively referred to as “‘patent law’s 
disclosure requirement.’”113 These doctrines attempt to, among other 
things,114 ensure that the scope of the claims is commensurate with 
the inventor’s technological disclosure in the patent. In practice, 
however, it turns out that actually applying the disclosure 
                                                     
 109. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 
722, 732 (2002) (“The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead 
embraces all equivalents to the claims described.”); accord Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. 
v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (“‘To temper unsparing logic and 
prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of the invention’ a patentee may 
invoke [the doctrine of equivalents] . . . ‘if it performs substantially the same 
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.’” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929))); Winans v. 
Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 346 (1853) (“It is, that this court shall extend, by 
construction, the scope and operation of his patent, to embrace every form which in 
practice will yield a result substantially equal or approximate to his own.”).  
 110. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 111. Compare Cedarapids, Inc., 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (concluding that a 
broad claim covering mechanical arts can be enabled by a disclosure of a single 
embodiment), with Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., 501 F.3d 1274, 1285 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (concluding that a claim encompassing both electronic and 
mechanical sensors was not supported by the disclosure of only a mechanical 
sensor). Credit for this juxtaposition goes to NARD, supra note 28. See also 
Holbrook, supra note 94 (discussing the limitations of current disclosure doctrine).  
 112. I note that claim limitation might arguably be another mechanism for 
limiting the scope of patent claims to what has been disclosed, but that doctrine has 
evolved in a very different direction. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“For instance, 
although the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the 
invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those 
embodiments.”). 
 113. Jason Rantanen, Patent Law’s Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. 
L. J. 369, 371-75 (2013). 
 114. See id. at 373-74 (discussing purposes of patent law’s disclosure 
requirement beyond commensurability).  
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requirement is challenging from a technical, legal, and conceptual 
perspective; and there are rarely easy answers.115 
In part, this is due to the general nature of the statute 
embodying the disclosure requirement. The text, 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), 
states:  
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and 
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which 
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the 
same . . . .116 
While this provision clearly requires information about how to 
make and use the invention, it does not necessitate (nor has it been 
interpreted to require) disclosure of every possible permutation of the 
invention.117 Rather, a person of skill in the art is expected to bring 
his or her knowledge to bear,118 and even then, some experimentation 
(although not undue experimentation) is allowed.119 As a result, the 
enablement inquiry is flexible, sometimes turning on the knowledge 
and skills of a person of skill in the art,120 sometimes turning on 
whether the experimentation required is undue,121 and sometimes 
turning on yet other legal issues.122 Similarly, the written description 
                                                     
 115. See Chiang, supra note 15, at 537 (“If obviousness is the most nebulous 
concept in patent law, then enablement and written description is a close second.”). 
 116. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 117. See NARD, supra note 28, at 107 (“Patent law does permit applicants to 
claim generically without disclosing each and every species as long as the disclosure 
is sufficient.”). Disclosure doctrine scholarship that influences my description of 
how the doctrine actually works includes Holbrook, supra note 94; Sean B. 
Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (2010); 
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009); Lisa Larrimore 
Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545 
(2012); see also Rantanen, supra note 113. 
 118. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 
(Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 119. See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 
F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 120. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 121. See, e.g., Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg, Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 
452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1997). Nor is it a simple matter to determine how 
much experimentation is “undue”: Answering this question turns out to be quite a 
challenge.  
 122. Such as the “full scope” tension, which I will not get into here. 
Compare Liebel-Flarsheim, Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (“[A]s part of the quid pro quo of the patent bargain, the applicant’s 
specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of 
the claimed invention.” (quoting AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 
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requirement imposes a limited constraint on the permissible 
boundaries of the claims: Its role is fairly circumscribed outside the 
context of biotechnology.123  
In addition, it is a fundamental principle of patent law that an 
inventor is not limited to only the embodiments disclosed in the 
specification. As Donald Chisum observes: “An enabling disclosure 
is all that is required. The applicant need not describe actual 
embodiments or examples. Indeed, an applicant need not have 
reduced the invention to practice prior to filing.”124 
This legal structure allows an inventor to claim broadly, with 
only a limited constraint imposed by the enablement and written 
description doctrines. Oskar Liivak, in Rescuing Invention from the 
Cult of the Claim, for example, notes the widely held view that 
“[c]laims are frequently a far cry from what the inventor invented.”125 
This is not to say that patent law’s disclosure requirements 
have no teeth. To the contrary, patent claims are invalidated for 
extending beyond what the enablement and written description 
requirements allow.126 Yet, what one person might see as an enabled 
claim another might not.127 The point is not that there are no 
boundaries at all. Rather, the point is that the law on enablement and 
written description permits claiming beyond what is contained in the 
patent’s technological disclosure. Nor does the law lend itself to easy 
determinations. As one text put it: 
Regrettably, no precise equation allows us to determine whether a 
particular patent claim suffers from “undue breadth” in view of the 
                                                                                                                
1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003))), with Edwards Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve, Inc., 699 F.3d 
1305, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Precedent establishes that ‘[t]he enablement 
requirement is met if the description enables any mode of making and using the 
invention.’” (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added))). 
 123. See Liivak, supra note 21, at 13 (describing the conventional view of 
the invention). 
 124. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.03 (2014) (citation 
omitted). 
 125. Liivak, supra note 21, at 15 (quoting Judge Giles S. Rich in JANICE 
MUELLER, PATENT LAW 67 (3d ed. 2009)). Liivak, of course, was making this 
observation in the context of rebutting it, arguing that the proper way to conceive of 
the scope of rights is through the lens of invention, not claims. Id. 
 126. See, e.g., Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1358 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (invalidating patent claims for lack of written 
description). 
 127. See, e.g., Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil 
Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 1191-93 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Mayer, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing 
with the majority’s holding on enablement). 
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disclosure of the patent’s specification. . . . As informed by the Wands 
factors, the enablement requirement provides a solid starting point, but 
unfortunately not an easily applied rule, for assessing when a particular 
patent claim exceeds its appropriate scope.128 
The result is that the doctrines that embody the linkage between 
the technological disclosures of the patent and the claim scope are 
subject to stretching and contraction.129 Simply put, there is no 
doctrine in patent law that tightly limits the inventor’s rights to 
precisely what she disclosed; at best, there is a bungee cord. One 
must still stay within the ballpark of the technology, but where in the 
ballpark tends to be the important question.130 
                                                     
 128. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 
188 (2d ed. 2004). Perhaps, one might argue, the problem is thus one of litigation 
costs: There is an answer, but it requires such a high investment to discover that in 
most instances is simply not feasible. Perhaps that is so. But my own experience is 
that when resources are invested into litigation in a symmetric manner, as is often 
the case in patent litigation, the issues become more complex rather than easier to 
resolve as more facts are uncovered and resourceful attorneys come up with clever 
arguments. See, e.g., Richard B. Phillips, Jr. & Scott P. Stolley, Appellate Lawyers 
as Innovators, IN-HOUSE DEF. Q., 52-54 (2013) (describing the role of appellate 
lawyers in developing new ideas in a litigation). In any event, regardless of the 
cause, for all practical purposes enablement and written description often turn out to 
be very difficult issues to resolve and thus do not function as strong limitations on 
the maximum possible scope of claims. 
 129. Beyond the limitation on the disclosure requirement touched on above 
lies an even more complex and challenging puzzle for the enablement and written 
description requirements: How do they intersect with after-arising technology, that 
is, technological developments that emerge after the patent application is filed? The 
law in this area remains highly unsettled both doctrinally and theoretically, and thus 
adds yet additional kinks to the elastic leash on permissible claim scope. See, e.g., 
ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 204 (2012) (“[T]he enablement doctrine 
is itself in disarray in terms of whether an inventor can reach things that could not 
have been known at the time of the invention.”); see also Chiang, supra note 15, at 
537-38 (“Enablement and written description therefore contain two directly 
contradictory lines of cases.”); Morris, supra note 44, at 524 (“The courts expressly 
acknowledge [that the meaning of patent claims can change in unexpected ways] by 
requiring that claim language be interpreted by its meaning at different times, 
depending on whether the claim is being evaluated for obviousness, novelty, 
definiteness, infringement, enablement, and so on.”). 
 130. Recognize that I am not taking a normative position here on whether the 
enablement and written description requirements should be a strong limit on the 
scope of claims or whether, as currently structured, they impose about the right level 
of constraint. Rather, I am simply pointing out that they do not presently function as 
an ironclad restraint.  
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D. The Game of Claim Construction 
Any elasticity in the disclosure requirement might not be such a 
concern if the actual scope of claims were fixed. Then, at least the 
boundaries of the patent right would be known to some degree. To be 
sure, there might still be some malleability over whether those 
boundaries are actually valid, that is, supported by adequate 
disclosure. But at least the boundaries themselves would be 
knowable, and potential infringers would know whether they were 
within those boundaries.131  
But while this might be a normative aim,132 patent law does not 
actually work this way.  
A better way to think about patent litigation—particularly 
claim construction—is as a sports game or contest. And like any 
good game, both skill and chance determine its outcome.  
Take, for example, a baseball game. Picture a game in which 
the visiting team leads by a single run with two outs in the bottom of 
the ninth inning.133 An ace pitcher134 is on the mound. In hindsight, 
we can know that the ace pitcher will get the batter to make the final 
out, popping out to center field a few feet short of the wall, thus 
ending the game.135  
Yet, as the events themselves play out, the outcome would be 
anything but certain. A gust of wind pushing the ball a few feet 
                                                     
 131. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46-72 (2008) 
(arguing that patents do not provide effective notice of their scope); Christina 
Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. 
L. REV. 905, 928-34 (2010) (discussing unclear boundaries in patents that do not 
create or transform physical objects). 
 132. Claim construction is “a way of elaborating the normally terse claim 
language in order to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the 
claims.” Terlep v. Brinkmann Corp., 418 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 133. Such as at the end of the 2014 World Series between the San Francisco 
Giants and the Kansas City Royals where, in the penultimate moment of the final 
game of the final series of the 2014 baseball season, the Giants led 3-2, with two 
outs in the bottom of the last inning. For those who don’t follow baseball, this meant 
that if the Royals were to make one more “out,” the Giants would win. On the other 
hand, if the Royals were to score once before making an “out,” the game would 
continue on. And if the Royals were to score two runs before making an “out,” the 
Royals would win the game, the series, and the championship.  
 134. Such as Madison Bumgarner. 
 135. For example, we know that the Giants won the 2014 World Series. E.g., 
David Waldstein, Three-Ring Master, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2014, at B14.  
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farther could produce a completely different result. This is the 
external element of chance. But while chance is certainly an 
important component in baseball, even more central to the outcome 
are the abilities, the skills, the talent, and the other aspects of the 
players themselves and the choices they make. Perhaps all of the 
pitches that the pitcher threw were above the strike zone. Perhaps he 
made the conscious decision to throw the ball to that location 
because he knew that this particular batter would have a hard time 
hitting balls there. Another batter or another pitcher, and the game 
might come out another way. 
The parallels between patent litigation and sport resonate 
deeply. Patent litigation is²just as sports are²a struggle to win.
And while there are rules, those rules allow parties to have an effect 
on which party will prevail.136
It should be no surprise, then, that commentary on patent law is 
ILOOHGZLWKUHIHUHQFHVWR OLWLJDWLRQDVD³contest,´137 D³sport´138 and 
HYHQDVD³JDPH´139 And just like a contest, a sport, a game, patent 
136. Added to this is the fact that the rules in patent law are, if anything,
much less clear than the rules of baseball. 
137. See, e.g., N. Scott Pierce, The Effect of the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act on Collaborative Research, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC¶Y 133, 
134 (2012) (noting that the America Invents Act ³replaces a statutory provision for a 
contest between patent applications, or between a patent application and a patent 
based on priority of inventorship´); Teresa Riordan, Contest Over BlackBerry 
Patent, N.Y. TIMES, (June 7, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/07/ 
technology/07patent.html (discussing a Federal Circuit trial involving Research in 
0RWLRQDQGZKHWKHULW³VKRXOGEHEDUUHGIURPGRLQJEXVLQHVVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´; 
David Ward, David v Goliath Battle as Welsh Jeans Company Tells Levi’s to Butt 
Out, THE GUARDIAN (May 1, 2003, 9:19 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/ 
2003/may/02/wales (reporting on ³a contest being billed as San Francisco Bay 
versus Cardigan Bay´).
138. &RPPHQWDWRUVKDYHUHIHUUHGWRSDWHQWOLWLJDWLRQDV³WKHVSRUWRINLQJV´
See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from 
Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 (2005); 
Douglas J. Kline, Patent Litigation: The Sport of Kings, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 28, 
2004), http://www.technologyreview.com/business/13562/. While the emphasis is 
typically placed on the kings element (since the goal of the reference is typically to 
draw upon the idea that patent litigation is complicated and expensive), the reference 
to sport is also illuminating. In sports, some events are due to chance; much is also 
due to the skill of the individual players. 
139. $V*LOHV5LFKVDLG³the name of the game is the claim.´*LOHV65LFK
Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American Perspectives, 21 INT¶L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990) (emphasis omitted); see also 
Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(³Nearly every patent case will involve some amount of µword games,¶ because 
claims and claim constructions are, after all, just words.´); 3M Innovative Props. Co. 
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litigation—and by extension, the patent right itself—is affected by 
the participants in that game. 
Nowhere is this more true than in the claim construction 
game:140 the struggle between parties to get the court to adopt their 
interpretation of critical claim terms, terms on which the case will 
swing in favor of one side or another. Here, the patent right is at its 
most malleable. There is both substantial room for movement in 
claim scope, and the actions of the parties can affect that movement.  
To understand why, first recall the uncertain outcome of claim 
construction, discussed above. Regardless of whether one views 
those uncertainties as being due to the ambiguities of language or 
policy conflicts, the key point is that patent claim language is, from 
both a practical and legal perspective, unstable prior to 
adjudication.141 There is thus room for movement because claim 
scope is hardly set in stone prior to adjudication. The “nose of wax” 
rhetorical device is exactly that: a rhetorical device. The practical 
reality is that claim meaning can be altered within limits after the 
patent has issued.142 Even setting aside broader disputes over word 
meanings, there can be disagreement over even which contextual 
principles of claim construction apply. Worse, as one commentator 
humorously noted, “[u]nfortunately, the ‘canons’ of patent claim 
interpretation sometimes ‘fire’ at cross purposes.”143 By which he 
                                                                                                                
v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Plager, J., concurring) 
(“Claim construction then becomes a game of crystal ball gazing, not resolved until 
this court’s gaze is announced.”). 
 140. A reference not to be confused with Edward D. Manzo’s Claim 
Construction Game®, which is an actual game designed to teach people about claim 
construction. THE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION GAME, Registration No. 3,621,447; 
see Edward David Manzo – Lawyer Profile, MARTINDALE, 
http://www.martindale.com/Edward-D-Manzo/43373648-lawyer.htm (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2015). 
 141. See Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1301 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Claim interpretation is not always an exact science, and it is not 
unusual for parties to offer competing definitions of even the simplest claim 
language.”). 
 142. Cf. Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 147 (2000) 
(“Additionally, although courts in patent cases have some degree of latitude in 
claims interpretation, claims are not to be treated ‘like a nose of wax which may be 
turned and twisted in any direction.’” (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 
(1886))). 
 143. Edward D. Manzo, How to Improve Patent Claim Interpretations, 22 
FED. CIR. B. J. 203, 213 (2012). 
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meant that these principles of interpretation can come into direct 
conflict with one another.144 
Even once issued, a district court’s claim construction is still 
not the final word on claim scope. Most significant is the prospect of 
change by the Federal Circuit. That the Federal Circuit reverses 
district court claim constructions is a point so fundamental that 
perhaps it need not be supported.145 One need not point to isolated 
anecdotal cases, either: The literature is full of empirical studies that 
specifically examine the rate at which the Federal Circuit reverses 
district courts on claim construction.146 While this rate has fallen in 
recent years,147 the Federal Circuit still modifies district court claim 
constructions and outright reverses them a meaningful portion of the 
time.148 Indeed, monitoring claim constructions is arguably one of its 
primary purposes.149 
The point here is not only that two intelligent, rational minds 
can arrive at different claim constructions, but also that the patent 
right continues to be molded well after its construction by the district 
court through freshly presented arguments by counsel. The Federal 
Circuit does not just reverse district court judges who make only a 
                                                     
 144. See id. 
 145. Krause and Auyang provide a host of examples. See, e.g., Thomas W. 
Krause & Heather F. Auyang, What Close Cases and Reversals Reveal About Claim 
Construction at the Federal Circuit, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 583, 
598-602, app. B (2013) (listing cases where the CAFC reversed the district court and 
narrowed or broadened claim terms). 
 146. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to 
Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15 (2001); David L. Schwartz, 
Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Comparing 
Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade 
Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1716 (2009); J. Jonas Anderson & 
Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative 
Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 39-41 (2013) 
(analyzing reversal rates since 2005 and finding reversal rates have decreased); 
Christopher A. Cotropia, Is Patent Claim Interpretation Review Deference or 
Correction Driven?, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming) (analyzing claim construction 
cases to determine whether “claim interpretation is still truly de novo and performed 
to correct lower court decisions (a) where patentees win and (b) especially where 
patents covering electronics, information technologies, and business methods 
succeed”). 
 147. Anderson & Menell, supra note 146, at 6 (finding the Federal Circuit’s 
“reversal rate has dropped significantly since the Phillips decision”).  
 148. Id.  
 149. See, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 
744 F.3d 1272, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (arguing that reversal rates for claim 
construction have decreased since Cybor).  
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passing effort at claim construction; it also reverses the claim 
construction of highly sophisticated patent judges with substantial 
patent law experience.150 
Perhaps it is a matter of the Federal Circuit judges getting it 
“right” and the district court judge getting the claim construction 
“wrong.” After all, three Federal Circuit judges sit on a reviewing 
panel, all of whom routinely review claim construction decisions.  
But Federal Circuit judges frequently disagree among 
themselves when it comes to claim construction.151 Examples 
abound. Consider the court’s recent decision in Azure Networks, LLC 
v. CSR PLC, which illustrates this disagreement.152 Judge Chen, 
joined by Judge Reyna, concluded that the district court erroneously 
construed the term “MAC address” in a particular patent claim.153 In 
their view, the correct construction of “MAC address” as used in the 
patent is “an address that uniquely identifies a device or group of 
devices on a shared communication medium.”154 Writing in dissent, 
Judge Mayer would have construed the term as meaning “an address 
assigned to a peripheral device by a hub device.”155 Both 
constructions were clearly reasonable, as evidenced by the rational, 
logical arguments each opinion offered.156 
District court judges, too, may alter their own claim 
constructions. Indeed, they may even depart from the Federal 
Circuit’s own construction if that construction was only preliminary 
                                                     
 150. See, e.g., Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil 
Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 1167, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (overturning Chief Judge Sue L. 
Robinson’s claim construction of “characterizable by an efficiency equation”); 
David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 256 (2008) 
(finding that “it does not appear that district judges’ reversal rates decrease as they 
handle more patent cases”). 
 151. See Krause & Auyang, supra note 145, at 586-98, app. A (noting the 
“vast differences” among CAFC judges within a panel when construing claim terms 
and listing cases where dissenting or concurring opinions argued for broader or 
narrower claim terms’ scope). 
 152. 771 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 153. See id. at 1337, 1339.  
 154. Id. at 1350. 
 155. Id. at 1353 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 156. Cf. id. at 1348-50, 1351-53 (Mayer, J., dissenting). Another example is 
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, in which Judge Linn, joined by Judge Moore, 
agreed that the district court erroneously construed the term “distributed learning 
control module” as a means-plus-function expression while Judge Reyna would 
have affirmed the district court’s construction. 770 F.3d 1371, 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
The Malleability of Patent Rights 933 
in nature.157 A district court judge may even adjust its claim 
construction after trial if that adjustment is merely an 
“elaboration.”158 
But the above examples merely establish that claim meanings 
are not stable. Perhaps, the counterargument might be that claim 
construction is just a process of drawing colored marbles out of an 
urn. It’s just a matter of randomness whether one draws a judge who 
likes your client’s claim construction or a judge who dislikes your 
client’s claim construction. This is a popular complaint: that claim 
construction is mostly a matter of chance.159 
And yet, such a view that claim construction is merely 
unpredictable masks the underlying ability of parties to affect the 
outcome of that game. Consider the strongest form of the panel 
dependency argument, that is, the empirical evidence presented by 
157. Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc., 695 F.3d
1285, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A] claim construction reached during an appeal from 
a grant of preliminary injunction is tentative and is not binding . . . in subsequent 
proceedings” (quoting Transonic Sys., Inc. v. Non-Invasive Med. Techs. Corp., 75 
F. App’x. 765, 774 (Fed. Cir. 2003))); see also Glaxo Grp. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376
F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“An appellate court’s preliminary injunction
opinion has no conclusive bearing at the trial on the merits and is not binding on a
subsequent panel.”); In re Papst Licensing Digital Camera Patent Litigation, 778
)3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“For that reason, it is worth reiterating that a
district court may (and sometimes must) revisit, alter, or supplement its claim
constructions (subject to controlling appellate mandates) to the extent necessary to
ensure that final constructions serve their purpose of genuinely clarifying the scope
of claims for the finder of fact.”).
 Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392,
1397 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have allowed district courts in the past to adjust 
constructions post-trial if the court merely elaborates on a meaning inherent in the 
previous construction.” (citing Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011))). “Elaboration” is a tricky word; one party’s “elaboration” 
can be another party’s “modification.” 
159. See, e.g., Greg Reilly, Completing the Picture of Uncertain Patent
Scope, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1359 (2014) (“Neither party can reliably predict 
the actual claim scope, which depends on the district judge’s choice of 
methodological approach and (absent settlement) whether this choice is the same as 
that of two of the three judges on the Federal Circuit panel.”); Kirk M. Hartung, 
Claim Construction: Another Matter of Chance and Confusion, 88 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 831, 831 (2006) (“Unfortunately, claim construction still is 
a matter of chance and confusion for patent owners, accused infringers and their 
patent attorneys. And the matter is only getting worse.”); Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari at 22, Hakim v. Cannon Avent Grp., PLC, 552 U.S. 951 (2007) (No. 07-
150) (“Perhaps the greatest problem facing the patent field today is the
unpredictability of the Federal Circuit’s approach to any given question of claim
construction.”).
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Lee Petherbridge and Polk Wagner of a split on the court between 
“proceduralist” and “holistic” judges.160 As Petherbridge and Wagner 
demonstrated in their 2006 study of claim construction, the approach 
a given judge follows will significantly affect the outcome of a claim 
construction.161 Two proceduralist judges on a panel will likely rule 
one way; two holistic judges, likely another.  
Yet knowing this, effective advocates will adjust their positions 
to compensate. For example, one attorney observes another split in 
claim construction strategy: the invention versus words approach.162 
“[U]se it to plan your advocacy in court. Judges’ predilections are 
often well-known. Do the research and pitch your claim construction 
arguments to emphasise the approach that the judge has favoured in 
his prior claim construction rulings.”163 While there is limited ability 
to do so in party briefs—the composition of the panel is not revealed 
to the public until the morning of oral argument164—it is well-
established among litigators that one would not, for example, argue a 
strong proceduralist position to, say, Judge Bryson.165 
                                                     
 160. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit 
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1105, 1180 (2004) (explaining that Federal Circuit judges employ two 
methodological approaches to claim construction, which leads to distinct results); 
see also Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 25-60 (2010) 
(describing the gulf between the “formalist” approach and the “holistic” approach in 
patent law jurisprudence).  
 161. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 160, at 1163 (finding “ample 
evidence of panel dependency in claim construction at the Federal Circuit”).  
 162. For a discussion of this split, see Jason Rantanen, Arlington Industries 
v. Bridgeport Fittings: “The Specification is the Heart of the Patent”, PATENTLY-O 
(Jan. 25, 2011), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/arlington-industries-v-
bridgeport-fittings-the-specification-is-the-heart-of-the-patent.html?utm_target/ 
=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+typepad%2FANlN+
%28Dennis+Crouch%27s+Patently-O%29. 
 163. Brad Lyeria, Understand the Two Approaches to Claim Construction, 
MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Nov. 2011, at 47, 49, http://jenner.com/system/ 
assets/publications/7425/original/47-49_Claim_construction.pdf?1321996721 
(describing two approaches as “the invention method” and “the words method”).  
 164. With the exception of an experiment in which panel composition was 
announced one week prior to oral arguments that ran in 2005. See Kristen Osenga, 
Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 72 n.50 (2006) 
(describing the experiment and the ways in which litigants may have altered their 
behavior in response).  
 165. I use Judge Bryson here by way of example; as Petherbridge and 
Wagner demonstrated, he is not the only judge to exhibit preferences along the 
holistic–proceduralist spectrum. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 160, at 
1155. 
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Put more broadly, there is a strong perception among practicing 
attorneys that attorneys matter; that the choices and arguments they 
make, and the preparation that they put in, make a difference when it 
comes to claim construction.166 As one attorney observes, claim 
construction “is where skilled appellate advocates can most 
frequently turn defeat into victory at the Federal Circuit.”167  
Here are a few of tips for winning claim construction offered 
by one litigation consultant: “[k]now your judge,” “[u]nderstand 
your tech tutorial procedure,” “[w]ork with your expert,” and 
“practice.”168 One can find numerous variations on this theme.169 The 
idea here is that a well-prepared attorney, who has done her research, 
will be more successful at having a judge adopt her client’s claim 
constructions than one who is less prepared. Not unlike how an elite 
                                                     
 166. This is true not only for claim construction, but also for arguments 
before the Federal Circuit more generally and probably for nearly all legal 
arguments, as I discuss below. As another example, consider Rachel Clark Hughey, 
Effective Appellate Advocacy Before the Federal Circuit: A Former Law Clerk’s 
Perspective, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 401 (2010) (offering guidelines and tips on 
being an effective advocate before the Federal Circuit). As a few examples, Hughey 
notes that while clerking on the court “I came to realize that the ineffective attorneys 
often made the same mistakes, and that their mistakes would have been easy to 
remedy had the lawyers only realized they were making them,” and “[w]ithout a 
strong appellate brief, it is going to be hard to win your case.” Id. at 401, 404 
(footnote omitted); see also Meredith Addy, Appellate Strategy Before the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in PATENT LITIGATION, NEGOTIATION, AND 
SETTLEMENT, LEADING LAWYERS ON STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVELY RESOLVING 
PATENT DISPUTES (2006) (“Experienced Federal Circuit practitioners know how to 
prepare an appeal tailored to the unique experience Federal Circuit judges have.”). 
 167. Roy Wepner, Overview of Practice Before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in BUILDING & ENFORCING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY VALUE: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE FOR THE BOARDROOM 2003 100, 103 
(2002), http://ldlkm.com/pdfs/wepner.pdf (“Simply stated, a case can be salvaged at 
the Federal Circuit on the issue of claim construction simply through better 
advocacy.”). 
 168. Ryan H. Flax, The Litigation Consulting Report: 11 Tips for Winning at 
Your Markman Hearing, A2L CONSULTING (Oct. 10, 2013, 2:25 PM) (emphasis 
added), http://www.a2lc.com/blog/bid/67898/11-Tips-for-Winning-at-Your-
Markman-Hearings. 
 169. See, e.g., Ed Mannino, Five Ways Trial Lawyers Can Defeat Patent 
Trolls in Litigation (Updated), ED MANNINO (Jan. 21, 2013), 
http://edmannino.com/blog/five-ways-trial-lawyers-can-defeat-patent-trolls-in-
litigation/; Andrew Y. Piatnicia, The Road to a Successful Markman Hearing, 
LAW360 (May 22, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/57110/the-
road-to-a-successful-markman-hearing; Robert T. Haslam & Thomas B. Walsh IV, 
Tips for Constructing Your Markman Hearing (July 27-28, 2006), 
http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/5964/2158.htm. 
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athlete prepares and trains in order to be in the best possible position 
to win.  
Consider a parallel line of thought: It is well established that 
the availability of resources gives parties an advantage in patent 
litigation.170 In other words, litigation outcomes tend to favor the 
party who spends more money on the litigation. This makes sense 
from a market-driven perspective: Parties with more resources are 
able to hire more effective counsel; are able to invest more resources 
in finding prior art (if they are the accused infringer); can allow their 
counsel to spend more time thinking about case strategies; can hire 
more prestigious experts; can develop more challenging and complex 
doctrines, such as the doctrine of equivalents; and can argue more 
creative strategies (such as subject matter eligibility, which prior to 
2010 was widely regarded as a fairly minor doctrine)171 and other 
cost-driven components of patent litigation.172 
                                                     
 170. See JOHN W. SCHLICHER, SETTLEMENT OF PATENT LITIGATION AND 
DISPUTES 33 (2011) (noting that a party with more resources has an edge in 
litigation because “[f]or many, if not most, patent issues, there is likely to be a 
positive relationship between litigation costs and both the owner’s probability of 
winning and the infringer’s probability of avoiding losing”); Rebecca Love Kourlis, 
Jordan M. Singer & Natalie Knowlton, Reinvigorating Pleadings, 87 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 245, 282 (2010) (“[T]he ultimate success or failure of a claim for patent 
infringement must turn on specific facts—facts that require time, energy, and money 
to uncover during the discovery phase.”); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in 
Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 83 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 558, 590, 591 & n.125 (2001) (reporting that financial 
resources correlate with patent litigation success due to litigation costs of forum 
shopping). 
 171. See CRAIG ALLEN NARD & R. POLK WAGNER, PATENT LAW 122 (2008) 
(“Although defining the scope of patentable inventions—and requiring them to be 
‘useful’—are perhaps the most basic requirements of any patent system, the actual 
application of § 101 in the modern patent law is rather rare.”). 
 172. Of course, I’m not making the claim that litigation outcomes are 
dictated solely by who spends the most money; that obviously would be absurd and 
lacks any empirical support. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Populism and Patents, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 91 (2007) (noting advantages in patent litigation, including 
having more money and the ability to hire better lawyers but finding other factors 
that dictated outcomes, particularly the idealized nature of the individual inventor). 
The point is merely that money spent in patent litigation can affect outcomes, from 
the construction of claim terms to issues of validity and infringement. This is 
because there is substantial flexibility in the scope of the rights that a patent gives; 
those probabilities are not random, but rather are affected by the actions of the 
parties themselves, and even who the parties to the litigation are. See id. 
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Patent law is not, of course, the only area where the lawyer’s 
skills can alter the outcome.173 As Judge Frankel observed about our 
litigation system, “[i]n principle, the paramount objective is the 
truth.”174 But the adversarial process lets the truth get lost: “The 
business of the advocate, simply stated, is to win if possible without 
violating the law. (The phrase ‘if possible’ is meant to modify what 
precedes it, but the danger of slippage is well known.) His is not the 
search for truth as such.”175 And consider Judge Frankel’s description 
of the zealous advocate:  
 Unfettered by the clear prohibitions actual “knowledge” of the truth 
might impose, lawyers may be effective and exuberant in employing the 
familiar skills: techniques that make a witness look unreliable although the 
look stems only from counsel’s artifice, cunning questions that stop short 
of discomfiting revelations, complaisant experts for whom some shopping 
may have been necessary. The credo that frees counsel for such arts is not 
a doctrine of truth-seeking.  
 The litigator’s devices, let us be clear, have utility in testing dishonest 
witnesses, ferreting out falsehoods, and thus exposing the truth. But to a 
considerable degree these devices are like other potent weapons, equally 
lethal for heroes and villains. It is worth stressing, therefore, that the 
gladiator using the weapons in the courtroom is not primarily crusading 
after truth, but seeking to win. If this is banal, it is also overlooked too 
much and, in any event, basic to my thesis.176 
Indeed, it would not be much of a stretch to say that all litigation 
outcomes are affected, to some extent, by the respective skill, 
investment, experience, and knowledge of the parties, and the 
strategic and tactical decisions they make along the way. Wouldn’t 
                                                     
 173. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 857, 881-82 (2001) (“Because of the resources required by litigation, the ‘basic 
architecture’ of the litigation process means that wealthier, repeat participants [will 
succeed more often in litigation.] Repeat players can structure the process in ways 
that disadvantage those with fewer legal experiences. This is especially true for 
broad ‘cause-oriented’ litigation. Richer interest groups achieve greater success in 
court. Successful litigation, especially in complex matters, requires top quality 
lawyers who might be especially costly to retain. Those unable to retain the best 
counsel are more likely to lose in court and consequently set adverse precedents for 
similarly situated parties.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Marc Galanter, Why the 
“Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 95, 114-19, 135-51 (1974) (explaining how parties’ typology can affect 
litigation outcomes and outlining strategies for reform). 
 174. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1975) (emphasis added). 
 175. Id. at 1037.  
 176. Id. at 1039. 
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this suggest that everything is malleable, thus rendering the concept 
meaningless? 
No. If all legal determinations are malleable, then malleability 
is far more of an important concept than the literature has yet 
recognized. But I am not making such a broad claim. First, as I 
indicated at the outset, malleability exists along a spectrum; some 
legal rights can be more malleable than others. Malleability does not 
imply complete malleability. Many legal rights are less malleable 
than, say, the patent right. Consider, for example, the boundaries set 
out in a deed. Sometimes they can be subject to dispute, but 
boundary disputes tend not to dominate the litigations where rights in 
real property are being contested.177 Certainly not in a way that 
boundary disputes dominate patent litigation.178 
Second, there is a difference between the effect a skillful 
lawyer or other party resources can have on the outcome of a dispute 
and their impact on the scope of the (patent) right itself. Unlike a 
case like, say Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., where the 
                                                     
 177. One property hornbook, for example, devotes nine pages to boundary 
issues in real property descriptions. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. 
WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 819-27 (3d ed. 2000). Many property casebooks 
barely touch on the issue.  
 178. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 131, at 235-53; Mossoff, supra 
note 12, at 1696-1704; Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest 
for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2170-74 (2013). It is not uncontested, 
however: in challenging what he refers to as the “trespass fallacy” Adam Mossoff 
argues that there is a lack of empirical evidence that real property boundaries are as 
stable and determinate as patent law commentators envision. See Mossoff, supra 
note 12, at 1704-08. But care must be taken in overreading claims of indeterminacy 
in real property law, at least with respect to claim scope. Central to Mossoff’s 
argument is that boundary issues in real property must be considered in terms of the 
estate boundaries, not just the physical description of the land. See id. at 1704 (“If 
the boundaries of patents are to be compared to the boundaries of real estate, then 
commentators and judges must include the doctrines that secure the temporal, 
geographic, and functional dimensions and which together define the scope of a 
property right secured in an estate.”). To be sure, this is an important focus, but the 
appropriate comparison to patent law, then, is to consider the entire bundle of rights 
granted by statute (i.e., the right to make, use, offer to sell, sell, and several 
additional rights as spelled out in 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012)), along with questions of 
assignment and ownership, which implicate additional issues and levels of 
complexity beyond just the question of the boundaries of the invention itself. In 
other words, if the discussion is about claim scope, then analogies to disputes over 
deed descriptions can be appropriate; if the discussion is about the scope of the 
patent right along all dimensions, then analogies should be drawn to the full scope of 
the estate. Cf. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Cognitive Economy and the Trespass Fallacy: 
A Response to Professor Mossoff, 65 FLA. L. REV. FORUM 38, 40 (2014) (suggesting 
a scaling down of the trespass analogy in patent law).  
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question was whether causation was present in the series of events, 
and thus whether the railroad was liable,179 patent litigation almost 
always involves disputes over the scope and strength of the right 
itself. Using an analogy to real property, the primary issues in patent 
infringement suits that parties typically fight over are the metes and 
bounds of the parcel itself and whether the premises encompassed by 
those boundaries are legitimately capturable. In patent law those 
boundaries are nearly always in play.180  
The consequences of a particular claim construction add an 
additional layer because a claim construction outcome can alter the 
rights with respect to others. When a patent holder wins or loses on 
claim construction, that claim construction can bind the patent holder 
with respect to not only its immediate opponent, but also everyone 
else the patent holder seeks to assert the patent against.181 Worse, 
when a patent holder loses on validity, the subject claims become 
invalid against the world.182 And while a claim construction decided 
                                                     
 179. 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). 
 180. The distinction between rights and outcomes may be too formalistic for 
some. One might characterize the issue in Palsgraf as the extent of tort duties and 
thus, the parties’ corresponding rights. Viewed in that light, Palsgraf arguably 
embodies malleability since a more skilled advocate could conceivably have 
persuaded one more judge, such that the way those duties were defined could have 
been different. But I do think there’s enough of a difference between the defined 
property-like rights of a patent and the scope of duties under tort law such that we 
can describe the former as pretty clearly involving the malleability of a right and the 
latter as merely conceivably involving the malleability of a right.  
 181. See, e.g., E.Digital Corp. v. Futurewei Techs. Inc., 772 F.3d 723, 726-
27 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding the district court correctly applied collateral estoppel by 
using an earlier claim construction of an identical limitation). E.Digital reiterates, 
however, that collateral estoppel does not apply to unrelated patents, see id. at 727 
(“These distinctions reinforce the well-understood notion that claims of unrelated 
patents must be construed separately.”), and there must be a final judgment on the 
merits. Id. 
 182. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 
324-26 (1971). Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein refer to the different 
categories of defenses as “individualized” and “general” defenses with 
noninfringement being a paradigmatic individualized defense, as it “does little to 
shield third parties from future infringement suits.” See Gideon Parchomovsky & 
Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1483, 1499 (2013). 
In my view, Parchomovsky and Stein overstate to some extent the potential effect of 
a noninfringement finding that flows from a narrow claim construction, cf. Roger 
Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 110 
(2013) (“[A noninfringement] judgment can benefit others if it results in claim 
interpretations that make the patent less likely to be infringed.”), although I 
acknowledge that there is an asymmetry. See Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: 
Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA 
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in one case may not similarly be used against third-party, potential 
infringers, there can be some persuasive effect.183 
Malleability, then, is not just about one side winning due to its 
greater litigation assets or more skillful arguments. Rather, it is about 
the potential for parties to alter the scope and strength of rights that 
are good as against the world. That potential is very real in patent 
law, particularly because the very scope of the patent right is in 
dispute,184 and it is only natural that the skills, experience, 
knowledge, and preparation of each party’s attorneys are brought to 
bear on precisely that point.  
Related to this point is the very nature of the claim construction 
process, which enhances patent malleability well beyond other legal 
rights where the scope of rights may be relatively fixed. Claim 
construction is fraught with competing doctrines and principles with 
complex precedents stirred together with an array of canons of 
greater or lesser strength.185 One of the most useful articles on claim 
construction,186 Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and 
Structure Framework, represents the efforts of three leading voices 
in patent law to bring some coherence and organization to the 
process.187 It is a mere 120 pages long.188 There are entire treatises 
                                                                                                                
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 179-80 (2006). The more important point, 
however, is that while there may be an asymmetry, both noninfringement outcomes 
and invalidity outcomes can negatively affect the patent right.  
 183. See CHISUM, supra note 124, § 19.02(e)(iii) (describing examples of 
cases in which prior construction is given persuasive effect); Larry Akers et al., The 
Interpretation of Patent Claims, 32 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 1, 71-72 (2004) 
(articulating an/the argument that if claim construction is a matter of law, then prior 
constructions should be entitled to stare decisis, but observing that it is “[a]n open 
issue [] whether the determination of claim construction from a prior litigation is 
entitled to stare decisis”); David Krinsky, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis, and 
the Role of Appellate Deference in Patent Claim Construction Appeals, 66 MD. L. 
REV. 194, 198-99 (2006) (concluding that under Markman, claim construction is 
entitled to stare decisis effect but arguing that this holding should be jettisoned). 
 184. Cf. Dan L. Burk, Dynamic Claim Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 107, 113 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) 
(“The language of patent claims, defining a property right, is not simply efficacious 
as between the parties: it is intended to be efficacious against the world.”). 
 185. Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Claim scope determination is a question of law that can be 
complex in that it may involve many claim construction doctrines.”). 
 186. Indeed, I recommend it to my patent law students.  
 187. Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim 
Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 711 (2010). 
 188. Id.  
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devoted to just the subject of claim construction.189 Layered on top 
are theories of claim construction, such as the holistic–procedural 
divide discussed above. Of course, just knowing the principles and 
precedents isn’t enough: Being able to effectively apply them is yet 
more challenging. As one treatise on claim construction observes, 
“[a]nnouncing the substantive precepts of patent claim interpretation 
is one thing, but applying them to the facts of a case can be much 
more perplexing, particularly where precepts can be in opposition to 
one another, and district judges cannot always tell which one(s) 
apply in a particular case.”190 Here, then, the skill and knowledge of 
the litigator can potentially matter a great deal.191 
As a final point, it is also important to recognize that even 
claim ambiguity itself can be a deliberate strategic choice. Patent 
drafters may choose, for example, claim terms and phrases that 
maximize future malleability so that they can later argue for either 
expanding or narrowing depending on the circumstances. 
“Sometimes [claim] ambiguity is the result of sloppy drafting, and 
sometimes it appears that claims are drafted with a degree of 
indefiniteness so as to leave room to later argue for a broad 
interpretation designed to capture later-developed competition.”192 
                                                     
 189. See, e.g., THOMAS L. CREEL, PRACTICING LAW INST., PATENT CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION AND MARKMAN HEARINGS (2013); ROBERT C. KAHRL, PATENT CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION (2001).  
 190. EDWARD MANZO, CLAIM CONSTRUCTION IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1:2 
(2015). 
 191. See Intellectual Property Litigation, V&E LAW, 
http://www.velaw.com/practices/IntellectualPropertyLitigation.aspx [https://web. 
archive.org/web/*/http://www.velaw.com/practices/IntellectualPropertyLitigation.as
px] (“Since 1995, our lawyers have conducted over 50 Markman hearings achieving 
a successful and decisive claim construction from the courts in the vast majority of 
these cases. Our success before the Federal Circuit is no different we have obtained 
favorable decisions for our clients in nearly every appeal we have handled.”); Patent 
Litigation and Trial, WILLIAMS MORGAN P.C., http://www.wmalaw.com/patent-
litigation (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (listing successful Markman hearing outcomes 
and hyperlinking to court documents). 
 192. 3M Innovative Props. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (Plager, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Brad Lyeria, Words 
Method vs. Invention Method of Claim Construction, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 20, 
2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/intellectual/articles/winter 
2012-words-invention-claim-construction.html (“It is no secret that claims are 
sometimes deliberately drafted to include some uncertainty as to their scope for the 
precise reason that it may give the patentee an advantage if the patent is litigated.”); 
cf. ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING 
§ 10:1.1[B] (6th ed. 2008) (“The claim drafter should preferably have a claim 
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Such intentional ambiguity can grant maneuverability to lawyers 
arguing over claim construction in the future. 
E. Patents as Multiple, Semi-Independent Bundles of Rights 
Patent law also contains a profoundly structural aspect whose 
defining characteristic adds to the malleability of the patent right.  
Here, I refer to the composition of the “patent right” as actually 
consisting of semi-independent bundles of rights that the patent 
holder can selectively assert. While patents are often spoken of in 
terms of a bundle of rights, those rights are generally conceived of as 
being merely different in type, i.e., the exclusive right to make, the 
exclusive right to sell, the right to alienate, etc.193 In other words, the 
rights to a particular “invention.” But this is not the way that patents 
are actually structured. Rather than being a single bundle of rights, 
they are instead composed of multiple sets of bundles of overlapping 
rights. What do I mean by this?  
As discussed above, patent rights are based on claims. But 
patents rarely contain only a single claim. Instead, they typically 
involve multiple claims that are structured in a particular way: from 
broad to narrow.194 Patent-claim sets start with an “independent” 
claim that defines the invention in relatively broad terms. For 
example, consider the following independent claim from a recently 
litigated patent: 
1. A method of enhancing the chemical stability of an aqueous 
composition comprising a therapeutically-effective amount of a 
prostaglandin, wherein the method comprises adding a chemically-
                                                                                                                
generic to all alternatives and to all embodiments, in addition to other claims 
specific to particular ones of the alternatives or embodiments.”). 
 193. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, The Law and Economics Approach to 
Property 2 n.16 (Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 277, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2375933 (“[V]irtually all economists, as well as most legal 
scholars, treat property as a ‘bundle’ of discrete rights and obligations.”); see also 
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
673 (1999) (noting that exclusionary rights, the “hallmark of a protected property 
interest,” are “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property” (citation omitted)). It’s important to keep in 
mind that the bundle analogy refers to each stick as a discrete type of right such as 
the right to possess or the right to alienate. See Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. 
Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 194. In some instances, the examiner may require this. See MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01(m) (9th ed. 2014) (“Claims should 
preferably be arranged in order of scope so that the first claim presented is the least 
restrictive.”). 
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stabilizing amount of a polyethoxylated castor oil [(PECO)] to the 
composition.195 
This claim sets out the boundaries of the invention at a particular 
level of abstraction. Next, consider claims 2 through 4, which 
“depend” from claim 1: 
2. The method of claim 1 wherein the polyethoxylated castor oil is present 
at a concentration between about 0.02 wt % and about 20.0 wt %. 
3. The method of claim 2 wherein the polyethoxylated castor oil is present 
at a concentration between about 0.1 wt % and about 5.0 wt %. 
4. The method of claim 3 wherein the polyethoxylated castor oil is present 
at a concentration between about 0.5 wt % and about 2.0 wt %.196 
Claim 2 refers back to claim 1, adding a limitation about the 
concentration of the PECO. Claim 3 refers back to claim 2, further 
narrowing the concentration. And claim 4 narrows the concentration 
even more. The result is a funneling down of the invention from the 
broadest claim of rights to the narrowest. Note that the narrowing 
need not be with respect to a specific limitation, as it is here. It could 
be along other axes, such as claim 12, which reads “[t]he method of 
claim 1 wherein the composition is a topically administrable 
ophthalmic composition.”197 
This formal structure produces significant consequences. There 
is an old saying in patent law that “[t]he stronger a patent the weaker 
it is and the weaker a patent the stronger it is.”198 This saying 
captures a key tension in patent law: A broad claim can encompass a 
greater scope, but it is more susceptible to invalidity because it 
covers more categories of prior art; may be more likely to fail written 
description or enablement; or may not comply with the other 
patentability requirements.199 In contrast, a narrow claim is more 
likely valid, but weak in the sense that it likely encompasses fewer 
                                                     
 195. U.S. Patent No. 5,631,287 col. 8 ll. 57-61 (filed Dec. 22, 1994). 
 196. Id. at col. 8 l. 62-col. 9 l. 3. 
 197. Id. at col. 10 ll. 52-53. 
 198. Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 641, 644 (1967) (emphasis omitted) (“To explain, a patent that 
is strong in that it contains broad claims which adequately protect the invention so 
they are hard to design around is weak in that it may be easier to invalidate and is 
therefore less likely to stand up in court because the claims are more likely to read 
on prior art or be broader than the disclosed invention, and for other reasons defense 
lawyers can devise. On the other hand, the patent with narrow claims of the kind the 
Patent Office readily allows quickly without a contest is weak as protection and as 
incentive to invest but strong in that a court will not likely invalidate it.”). 
 199. See id. 
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infringers or users and is also easier to design around.200 Patent 
drafters write patents to take advantage of both possibilities: that 
ideally a narrow claim will be used in the future, but perhaps it will 
be necessary to deploy a broad claim. Patents rarely contain just a 
single broad or narrow claim, but rather consist of a series of broad 
and narrow claims that funnel down from the broad and more likely 
invalid, to the narrow (and easier to design around) but more likely 
valid. 
Furthermore, the sets of rights granted by a patent—the 
claims—are independent in the sense that the validity of one is not 
necessarily dependent on the validity of another.201 This 
independence is not complete (hence why I refer to them as semi-
independent sets of rights); rather, they are still linked to some 
extent. But the important point is that determinations as to the 
validity of multiple patents claims are, to some degree, independent 
of one another.  
The result of this structure is that rather than consisting of a 
tidy bundle of rights, patents end up being comprised of multiple sets 
of semi-independent bundles of rights that overlap with one another 
and that include both bundles of strong-but-narrow rights and weak-
but-broad rights. Unsurprisingly, many of the paradigmatic validity 
disputes in patent law turn out to be over this latter set of claims: the 
weak-but-broad rights.202 The narrow-but-strong claims were likely 
still around, in the background, and typically protected the core 
embodiment of the patent holder’s technology; of course, they may 
also not be infringed.203 
                                                     
 200. Id. 
 201. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“Each claim of a patent (whether in 
independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid 
independently of the validity of other claims . . . .”). 
 202. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 4, 37 
(1966) (invalidating a patent that sought to cover the field of “Clamp[s] for vibrating 
Shank Plows” because the patent was considered obvious in light of prior art); 
Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465, 468, 475-77 (1895) 
(invalidating a claim that sought to cover the field of incandescent lamp conductors 
consisting of “carbonized fibrous or textile material” because the patentee only 
enabled a species of the genus claim); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 62 (1853) 
(invalidating a claim that sought to cover “electro-magnetism, however developed, 
for making or printing intelligible characters, signs or letters at any distance” 
because, in part, the patentee did not enable the full scope of the claim).  
 203. Cf. Allison, Lemley & Schwartz, supra note 65, at 1788-89, 1784-85 
(finding that accused infringers tend to win on noninfringement more than 
invalidity); Michael Risch, A Generation of Patent Litigation, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
67, 125 (forthcoming 2015) (finding the same). 
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This multi-claim structure also allows patent drafters to include 
both highly ambiguous (and vague) claims and those that are much 
more specific to the embodiments of the patent. It represents a 
critical difference between patent rights and any form of traditional 
property regime. Imagine if someone could draft deeds this way. The 
deed might start with,  
The boundaries of my land extend as far as one can see from the big oak 
tree, but if a court finds that’s unclear, then they extend as far as I can see 
from the big oak tree. But if a court holds that that’s not clear enough, then 
they extend 100 paces outward from the big oak tree.204 
And on and on. Patent claims basically work like that, by forming a 
structure that gives a great deal of choice and flexibility to the patent 
holder.  
F. Post-Issuance Revision at the Patent Office 
A patent holder can also alter the formal scope of the patent 
right after the patent is issued.205 Two primary mechanisms are 
particularly relevant: reissue proceedings,206 through which patent 
holders can seek modification of patent claims with certain 
restrictions, and ex parte reexamination,207 which can also result in 
post-grant modification of claims.208 While these mechanisms do 
have limitations,209 they allow for some adjustment of the claims in a 
patent.  
This form of claim malleability is described extensively by 
Tun-Jen Chiang. Chiang offers a land-based analogy:  
                                                     
 204. See Rantanen, supra note 74, at 53. 
 205. For an extensive discussion of this ability, and why it is costly, see 
Chiang, supra note 15. 
 206. See CHISUM, supra note 124, § 15.01. 
 207. Id. § 11.07. Claim scope can also be changed during other post-issuance 
proceedings such as inter partes review, although in practice thus far that 
mechanism has been highly limited. See Rantanen, supra note 95. And although 
technically, continuations do not alter the scope of an issue patent, one can certainly 
take the position, as Chiang does, that continuations are a way to effectively alter the 
formal scope of the patent right after a patent has issued. I discuss this below in the 
context of patent families and portfolios. See infra Section III.G. 
 208. See CHISUM, supra note 124, § 11.07[4] (stating that if a reexamination 
is initiated, “[t]he patent owner may file a statement on the new question and add 
new or amended claims”). 
 209. Reissuance, for example, does not allow the patentee to “recapture 
subject matter intentionally surrendered to obtain the original patent” or, after two 
years, to “enlarge[] the scope of the original patent.” See id. § 15.01. 
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 Imagine a real property system where your neighbor is permitted to 
move his fence to encompass your new house. Moreover, he then sues you 
for trespassing and evicts you from the house. A real property system with 
such constantly moving fences would quickly break down, as people move 
fences in self-serving ways, litigate evictions, and stop building houses.  
 In comparison, a patentee is permitted to change his claims throughout 
the life of the patent, generally at-will with few substantive limits.210 
As Chiang observes, these mechanisms do not allow unfettered 
modification of the patent right: It is still subject to the same 
constraints as the original patent claims.211 And there are important 
limitations on this form of formal claim malleability: Broadening 
claim scope is generally not allowed, and “intervening rights” mean 
that the patent holder cannot obtain a monetary or injunctive remedy 
against products “made or sold prior to the completion of a 
reissuance or reexamination proceeding.”212 But that post-issuance 
claim amendment exists at all does, in Chiang’s words, “turn[] an 
important patent-law principle—that claim language defines the 
patentee’s right to exclude—on its head.”213  
G. Malleability and Patent Portfolios 
Although to this point I have spoken of patent rights as 
subsisting in the individual patent document, another view of patents 
is to look at them as a portfolio or a family. The basic idea behind 
the portfolio approach to patents is that owning a group of related 
patents is more valuable to the patent owner than the individual 
patents would be; in other words, “the whole is greater than the sum 
of its parts.”214 This is because, as Gideon Parchomovsky and Polk 
Wagner explain, the holder of a patent portfolio benefits from several 
offensive and defensive strategic advantages that holders of 
individual patents do not.215 In essence, they argue, the portfolio of 
related patents works like a “super-patent” that can grant tremendous 
market power to the portfolio owner.216 
                                                     
 210. Chiang, supra note 15, at 525. 
 211. See id. at 534 (“This does not mean, of course, that patentees may 
amend to claim anything under the sun.”). 
 212. Id. at 532-33. 
 213. Id. at 535. 
 214. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 5 (2005). 
 215. Id. at 7. 
 216. Id. 
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If patent portfolios are like “super-patents,” then they are also 
“super-malleable.” The scope of a patent is limited by its claims, 
which, as discussed above, are limited to some extent by the original 
filing. Collections of multiple, sometimes not even procedurally 
related, patents are not so limited. True, patent law doctrines still 
limit them, particularly those involving prior art. But within the 
portfolio context, scope can be added or subtracted by obtaining new 
patents and acquiring others from third parties. And because the 
whole is greater than the sum of the parts, strategically acquiring 
additional patents can alter the scope of the portfolio’s rights of 
exclusion by more than that of the individual patent. In other words, 
it is not the acquisition of the new patent per se that is the malleable 
aspect of portfolios; rather, it is the effect that the acquisition has on 
the exclusionary scope of the portfolio above and beyond the scope 
of the individual patent that is malleable in nature.217  
Nor does a patent owner need to assemble a complex portfolio 
to take advantage of the malleable nature of patents. Today, patents 
are often thought of not as individual documents but as part of a 
family of patents that is related by their connection to a common 
written description.218 Patent families are different from portfolios in 
that families are necessarily procedurally related. For example, a 
patent family might include an original patent application that 
ultimately issued as a patent (the “parent”); a continuation filed off 
that original patent that, also, issued as a patent at a later date (the 
“child”); and a continuation-in-part that issued off the second patent 
in the family that, too, issued as a patent at a later date (the 
“grandchild”).219 All three patents share some portion of (or all of, in 
                                                     
 217. Cf. Michael Risch, Patent Portfolios as Securities, 63 DUKE L.J. 89, 116 
(observing that in a portfolio sale, the value of the portfolio “depends on the buyer’s 
enforcement efforts[, while i]n a portfolio license, the success depends on the 
seller’s (licensor’s) efforts to maintain validity and license to other entities” (second 
emphasis added)).  
 218. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 460 
(2004) (defining “patent families” as “related patents issuing from the same original 
application”). 
 219. See CHISUM, supra note 124, § 13.03[1]. In Chiang’s discussion of post-
issuance modification of the formal scope of the patent claim, he groups 
continuations together with procedural mechanisms that allow for modification of 
words of the patent claim in the original patent. See Chiang, supra note 15, at 533-
34. Technically, as Chiang recognized, they are not. But given the concept of 
malleability articulated in this Article, I tend to agree with Chiang on a practical 
level. Patent rights are malleable, and both continuations and post-issuance 
proceedings are forms of malleability. Nevertheless, the distinction highlights an 
important limitation on these various mechanisms for altering the formal scope of 
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the case of the first two) the original written description; as a result, 
they all have some ability to claim the benefit of the original filing 
date.220  
This leads to the primary benefit of patent families: They 
permit the owner of the family to write and file new claims that get 
to rely on an earlier filing date.221 Thus when a patent challenger 
asserts invalidity based on a lack of “newness” (anticipation and 
obviousness), she must rely on prior art from before the filing date of 
the first patent in the family.222 This significantly complicates the 
task of invalidating those later added claims. The result is a very 
malleable set of rights that sophisticated patent holders can shift and 
alter to their advantage.223 
IV. IS THERE A THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE 
MALLEABILITY OF PATENT RIGHTS? 
Understanding that patent rights are malleable requires a 
rethinking of how patent law theory operates. It seems fairly 
unquestionable that malleability comes with substantial costs. Less 
clear is whether there is a meaningful justification. One place to 
begin is with the legal mechanisms that allow for the malleability of 
patent rights. In that space, the doctrine of equivalents, which I have 
not discussed in depth yet, helps shed some light on this question.  
The doctrine of equivalents is a mechanism that allows a patent 
holder to claim that a product or process infringes a patent even if it 
                                                                                                                
the patent claim: Generally speaking, rights don’t begin until a particular version of 
a claim actually issues or is at a minimum published (in the case of published 
applications containing claims). Thus, exclusive rights in a continuation patent 
won’t actually begin until that patent issues (or, for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) 
(2012), when claims are published), which can substantially impact damages-based 
remedies.  
 220. CHISUM, supra note 124, § 13.03[1]. 
 221. See id. § 13.03[2]. The analysis becomes more complex when it 
involves continuations-in-part, which may or may not be able to claim priority back 
to the original filing date, an issue that depends on whether they are supported by the 
original disclosure. Id. § 13.03[3] (“Claims that are dependent upon new matter 
added by a continuation-in-part (‘CIP’) application are entitled to the filing date of 
the CIP, not that of the parent application.”). 
 222. See id. § 13.01. 
 223. Cf. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 
874 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[It is] improper to amend or insert claims intended to cover a 
competitor’s product the applicant’s attorney has learned about during the 
prosecution of a patent application.”). 
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is not within the literal scope of the claim.224 It works by treating an 
element of the product or process as an equivalent of a particular 
claim limitation.225 For example, a patent claim covering a cone-
shaped rail car might not literally encompass an octagonal-shaped 
railcar.226 But under the doctrine of equivalents, that octagonal shape 
could be treated as an equivalent, and the accused rail car be ruled 
infringing.227 In effect, the scope of the claim extends beyond its 
literal scope. 
The doctrine of equivalents thus might be considered part of 
the malleability of patent rights, particularly under one normative 
justification for the doctrine of equivalents: that it “is to protect the 
patentee against later-developed technology.”228 For example, 
“transistors in relation to vacuum tubes, or Velcro® in relation to 
fasteners.”229 And as with claim construction, the additional scope 
provided by the doctrine is subject to alteration by the parties after 
the patent issues, as arguments about equivalency are made and 
developed, and are formalized into legal decisions.230 
But the after-arising technology rationale for the doctrine of 
equivalents is of limited use in considering malleability more 
broadly. The doctrine of equivalents is one-sided: It allows only for 
expansion of claim scope, not contraction.231 But many forms of 
malleability discussed in this Article are two-sided. The patent right 
may be expanded or reduced by parties after the patent issues. 
                                                     
 224. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 23-
28 (1997). 
 225. Id. at 24-28. 
 226. A classic example of the doctrine of equivalents from Winans v. 
Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 340-44 (1853). 
 227. Id. at 346-48 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
 228. Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession 
Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 17 (2009). 
 229. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 230. Consider, for example, the expansion and contraction of the doctrine of 
equivalents through the late 1990s and early 2000s, which manifested in a series of 
opinions. See, e.g., id.; Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17. The judges and Justices who 
wrote those opinions were not writing on a blank slate with a fresh pencil; they were 
responding to the arguments and positioning that the parties themselves presented, 
and as each opinion issued, the parties came up with creative new ways to respond 
to the new development.  
 231. To be sure, there is much lawyering that is done over whether the 
doctrine can apply and, if so, the extent to which it expands the literal claim scope, 
with parties arguing on each side. But the essence of the doctrine of equivalents 
involves an expansion of literal claim scope to encompass something beyond what 
the applicant actually stated in its claims.  
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Malleability in general, then, carries the potential for as much lost as 
gained. It is not simply a way of encompassing after-arising 
technology.232 
The unidirectional malleability of the doctrine of equivalents 
does offer an insight into the broader concept, however. In particular, 
while the doctrine of equivalents can only expand the scope of the 
claims, it is subject to many limitations.233 Thus, the doctrine of 
equivalents does not offer an unfettered ability to push out the 
boundaries of claim scope. To the contrary, this form of malleability 
is tightly constrained. Why is this? A possible explanation is that 
when a right exhibits unidirectional malleability in a particular 
dimension, strong restrictions on that malleability are particularly 
necessary in order to counterbalance that malleability.  
A second justification for the doctrine of equivalents is that it is 
intended to compensate for the limitations of human beings and 
human language.234 Human beings are not omniscient; language is 
not a perfect medium of communication. The doctrine of equivalents 
allows a patent holder to expand beyond the literal language because 
our system recognizes the impossibility of perfectly claiming a 
technological advance.235 
Perhaps, then, malleability is unavoidable. Because language is 
imperfect, and because legal rules are to some degree indeterminate, 
the result is necessarily going to be that parties are going to argue 
                                                     
 232. If there were a meaningful reverse doctrine of equivalents, under which 
“a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the 
same or a similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls 
within the literal words of the claim” would not infringe, Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. 
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950), then perhaps the malleability 
here would be bidirectional, and this bidirectional form of malleability would be a 
sophisticated way of dealing with the problem of after-arising technology. But the 
doctrine is, as Peter Lee observes, “moribund.” See Peter Lee, The Accession Insight 
and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 175, 189 (2011); see also 
Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Not once has this court affirmed a decision finding 
noninfringement based on the reverse doctrine of equivalents.”). 
 233. For examples of the limitations on the doctrine of equivalents, see 
NARD, supra note 28, at 547-87. 
 234. See Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 731 (“The language in the patent claims 
may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe with complete precision 
the range of its novelty. If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their 
value would be greatly diminished.”). 
 235. Cf. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 
(2014) (“The definiteness requirement, so understood, mandates clarity, while 
recognizing that absolute precision is unattainable.”). 
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about the result, and the party with the better arguments—not 
necessarily perfect arguments, just better arguments—is going to 
win. Along a similar vein, perhaps malleability is simply the 
inevitable result of the difficulty of dealing with after-arising 
technology; that is, technological developments that do not occur 
until after the patent issues.236 
But this is less a justification and more a mere consequence. It 
does not tell us that malleability is good; it simply tells us that 
malleability is unavoidable and perhaps too costly to eliminate in its 
entirety. Malleability, then, becomes like the problem of ambiguous 
claims: We might like to get rid of it, but we can’t, so it is simply 
tolerated.  
Then there is the view that malleability is bad: that there is no 
viable theoretical justification for malleability and substantial 
theoretical justification for patent rights being fixed. Tun-Jen Chiang 
expresses this view in the context of formal modification of patent 
claims: 
 The fact that claims can be so easily changed, and with retroactive 
effect, calls into question their function as property boundaries. Property 
rights generally have a degree of stability to facilitate investment by their 
owners and others. A property whose boundaries are constantly shifting is 
a bad vehicle for investment—both for the property owner and any 
potential trespassers. Imagine, for example, that the fence on your land 
was constantly moving in random directions. This would make it very 
risky for you to improve your land, such as by building a house on it, 
because tomorrow the fence might move inwards and take away your 
ownership. On the other hand, your neighbors cannot improve their land 
either, because your fence might move outwards and strip them of their 
rights. To top it off, nobody would want to buy your land precisely 
because its future value is so hard to determine. Because patent claims are 
easily changed, they serve as poor boundaries, undermining the patent 
system for everyone.237 
Chiang’s point sounds loudly for the broader concept of 
malleability advanced in this Article. If what really matters are the 
actions and arguments of the parties after the patent issues, then it 
becomes particularly difficult to rely on a reading of the patent 
document itself. Patent rights, then, look a lot less like what we 
consider to be quality rights to land and a lot more like what we 
might consider to be poor rights to land: land in which the boundary 
is not merely shifting randomly, but shifting in response to the 
                                                     
 236. For a discussion of the problems of after-arising technology, see Kevin 
Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083 (2009).  
 237. Chiang, supra note 15, at 530 (citations and emphasis omitted). 
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actions of others. Under this view, we should be particularly cautious 
when we observe malleability in the patent right, particularly areas 
where there is substantial room for the actions of the parties to affect 
the scope and strength of the right.  
In addition, if patent rights are truly malleable and are subject 
to expansion and contraction by entities who can pull the right 
levers, then past cost-benefit assessments of the patent system may 
no longer be valid—particularly if patent rights are becoming more 
malleable. In this scenario, the scope of the rights relative to what 
was originally granted has changed. In other words, if a patent was 
granted with scope X now has scope X+Y, we might be concerned 
that the public has not actually received anything in return for this 
expanded grant.  
Of equal importance is the effect of malleable patent rights on 
the patent incentive. The incentive is effectively minimized if patent 
scope is due more to the types of arguments that litigators make in 
enforcement, or on other things that the inventor has little or no 
control over at the time of filing. The inventor’s contribution is of 
relatively less value, and the skilled patent asserter’s contribution is 
of greater value.  
Similarly, any expansion of the malleability of patent rights 
might call into question some of the doctrinal choices that were made 
in a past era. If the balances of the patent system were struck when 
patents had scope X, but now have scope X + Y or X í Y due to their 
malleable nature, it might be that competing weights of incentive 
versus competition may no longer be rightly balanced.238  
In addition, like uncertainty, malleability distorts the abilities of 
parties to know, ex ante, the boundaries of the exclusive rights that 
patents grant.239 This inability makes it more difficult for parties to 
transact. It may raise the costs of transactions because parties aren’t 
quite sure what they’re transacting about and must spend additional 
resources defining that substance. It may discourage capital 
investment because the investor is unwilling to invest in an activity 
where the potential return is both uncertain and can be diminished by 
the legal arguments of competitors. It can diminish incentives to 
commercialize, both in terms of new technologies (because the 
exclusive rights offered by the patent may be shrunk by competitors) 
                                                     
 238. Assuming, of course, that they ever were rightly balanced.  
 239. For a discussion of how uncertainty can impose costs on economic 
activity in the innovation context, see Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice 
Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 8-9 (2013). 
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and by competitors (because the exclusive rights obtained by an 
innovator may be expanded to encompass the competitor’s different 
product).  
Finally, while malleability may well come with substantial 
costs, those costs need to be weighed against the doctrinal cures. 
Malleability is both a general aspect of patent rights and comprised 
of multiple separate doctrines and issues. Viewed as a general 
matter, malleability may be undesirable. But when specific 
doctrines—doctrines such as the doctrine of equivalents or claim 
construct—are examined separately, it may be that the policy choices 
that underlie those malleability-creating doctrines outweigh the 
consequences of that malleability. Similarly, while issues such as 
lawyerly influence may not be expressed through doctrine, legal 
rules can, to some extent, cabin that influence. But even as they do, 
the costs of such rules may be too great to justify the benefits of 
reduced malleability. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that patent rights should be conceptualized 
not as rights frozen at the time of issuance, but as malleable rights 
that can be altered by various actors after the patents have issued.  
What, then, are the consequences of recognizing that patent 
rights are malleable? It turns out that they can be quite significant.240 
Consider, for example, the primary narrative articulated by 
supporters of emerging patent monetization strategies: that such 
strategies are economically efficient because they ensure that 
inventors receive their just rewards for the teachings of the patent 
and because they reduce transaction costs. 
But the persuasive ability of this narrative falters when viewed 
through the lens of malleable rights. Because patent rights are 
malleable, patent owners can actively expand the scope and strength 
of those rights independent of the patent’s technological teachings. 
In other words, patent owners can extract revenue not only by simply 
reducing transaction costs or adding to the value of the underlying 
technology, or (in the conventional challenge to the narrative) by 
reaping nuisance costs,241 but also by expanding the patent right itself 
                                                     
 240. I explore these consequences in greater detail in a separate essay, How 
Malleability Matters. Rantanen, supra note 95. 
 241. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. 
REV. 325, 342 (2012) (discussing “the incentive that exists to assert patents because 
defending against patent demands is expensive, and, therefore, induces settlement”); 
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after it has issued. This insight leads to an alternative narrative, one 
that does not revolve around efficiency gains.  
But malleability can work the other way, too: It can be used to 
push back against the scope and strength of a patent, even if the 
teachings of the patent reflect an important advancement in the art. 
Accused infringers may well be able to push back on patent scope 
and strength during litigation. Furthermore, challengers have the 
benefit of administrative mechanisms that expressly allow 
challengers to push back on scope or even terminate the patent right 
after it has issued. In particular, the recently implemented 
mechanisms of inter partes review and Covered Business Method 
Review affect the malleability of the patent right in a remarkably 
one-sided way.242 Furthermore, the consequences of these new 
mechanisms are not limited to just so-called “low quality” patents, 
but can affect a much broader range of patents. 
Conceiving of patent rights as malleable changes the ways in 
which contemporary issues in patent law are understood: The effect 
of nonpracticing entities may be to expand the scope and strength of 
patent rights rather than to merely solve transaction failures, and 
expanded administrative post-issuance review of patents at the patent 
office has the effect of increasing patent malleability in a one-sided 
way. Given the prevalence and potential expansion of patent 
malleability, the lack of a clear theoretical justification for 
malleability of patent rights raises serious questions about continued 
movement in this direction. 
 
                                                                                                                
Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
687, 707-11 (2010) (discussing the problems of nuisance patents); Ted Sichelman, 
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 368 (2010) (stating that 
nonpracticing entities “are often termed ‘patent trolls,’ because they tend to exploit 
litigation and licensing market defects to extract unwarranted rents from 
commercializers, usually on patents that the commercializer was completely 
unaware of before the NPE’s demand for payment”); Ranganath Sudarshan, 
Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Proposal, 25 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 160-62 (2008). 
 242. Rantanen, supra note 95. 
